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SOUTH AFRICA

UN Ambassador Addresses Disarmament Conference

*MB2105132392 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1208 GMT 21 May 92*

[Text] Johannesburg May 21 SAPA—South Africa was committed to a nuclear weapons free zone in Southern Africa, United Nations Ambassador Riaan Eksteen told the conference on disarmament in Geneva on Thursday [21 May].

Mr Eksteen cited South Africa's accession to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"Not only do these actions illustrate South Africa's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but they underscore our desire to achieve a nuclear weapons free zone in southern Africa," Mr Eksteen told the conference. A copy of his address was issued to SAPA in Johannesburg.

Mr Eksteen said the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa had invited nuclear scientists from Africa to visit its facilities and eventually to cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

"The first bilateral agreement following such a visit is almost finalised."

South Africa's presence at the Geneva conference was proof the country was taking practical steps to honour its international obligations.

"South Africa, being fully aware of its regional and global obligations...will play its rightful role as a responsible member of the international community."

Mr Eksteen told the conference the quest for the complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war must be addressed soon and with conviction.

"It is of great concern that with the obvious exception of the proposed chemical weapons convention, the conference on disarmament has not—at least during the time that South Africa has been an observer—achieved substantial progress on most of the other topics on its agenda."

U.S. To Reduce Europe, Korea Military Presence

*OW2205162892 Beijing XINHUA in English
1529 GMT 22 May 92*

[Text] Washington, May 22 (XINHUA)—The U.S. military will reduce its operations or close installations at 61 additional sites in Europe and two in South Korea, the Pentagon announced today.

The largest site affected in Europe is Peden Barracks in Wertheim, Germany, which is ending operations. Two other German sites, Pond Barracks in Amberg and Robinson Barracks in Stuttgart, are being reduced, the Pentagon said in a statement on its latest round of base cutbacks.

The European reductions will affect some 6,000 military personnel, 800 U.S. civilians and 2,500 local nationals.

The changes in South Korea, where operations will be ended or reduced at Songso and Camp Ames, will affect 246 military positions, six U.S. civilians and 257 local nationals, the Pentagon said.

The changes, part of the overall reductions in U.S. military forces planned by 1997, bring to 559 the number of military posts overseas at which operations will be reduced or ended, the Pentagon said.

Russia Reduces Military Presence in Kurils

*OW2305023692 Beijing XINHUA in English
0229 GMT 23 May 92*

[Text] Moscow, May 22 (XINHUA)—Russia's intention to reduce military presence on the southern Kuril Islands and the possibility of pulling out all its troops from there eventually has nothing to do with territorial demarcation, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said today.

He said the idea was out of the consideration to cut back surplus military presence on these islands, known in Japan as the four northern islands.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin said his country planned to decrease troops on the islands during his meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watababe early this month.

Some Japanese see the move as a step towards Russia's return of the four small islands off Hokkaido to Japan.

It was in reference to this view of the Japanese that the Russian spokesman made the statement today.

The state secretary for the Russian president, Gennadiy Burbulis, said today that Russia had begun to work out a

long-term plan for developing Russo-Japanese relations in preparations for Yeltsin's visit to Japan in mid-September.

Daily Urges U.S. 'Restraint' on Nuclear Testing

*HK2305054392 Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO
in Chinese 23 May 92 p 2*

[“Political Talks Column” by Shih Chun-yu (2457 0689 3768): “The United States Should Primarily Show Restraint on the Nuclear Test Issue”]

[Text] The Number of China's Nuclear Tests Is the Fewest

China conducted an underground nuclear test in Xinjiang area the day before yesterday. Regarding the recent nuclear test, China has handled it in a low-key manner, refraining from propagating the event in a big way. Of course, there was no secrecy about it to speak of; any underground nuclear test at any locality can be monitored and logged overseas so long as it boasts certain explosive force. The Hong Kong Observatory recorded a seismic wave from China's Northwest on the very afternoon of the explosion, and a Swedish organ promptly determined that it was a nuclear test. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman verified the nuclear test when answering reporters' questions.

Since China's first successful nuclear explosion test in 1964, it has conducted some 30 nuclear tests one after another over the past 30 years or so, with greater frequency at the initial stage, and such tests have been conducted at several-years intervals of late. As of today, the number of tests has been the fewest of the five countries possessing nuclear weapons. It is insignificant compared with the United States, which has a record of having conducted some 900 nuclear tests. Therefore, we can see that all along China has exercised great restraint in its nuclear testing.

When U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher required China, which has only conducted 30-some nuclear tests, to show restraint, while saying nothing about the approximately 1,000 U.S. nuclear tests, it made no sense. Boucher even banked on the explosive strength in China's nuclear testing, saying that it exceeded the scope in the agreement between the United States and the former Soviet Union. That is absurd. China has never participated in that U.S.-USSR accord; furthermore, the United States and former Soviet Union had each conducted numerous powerful nuclear explosive tests and each built her own nuclear arsenals, which are capable of destroying the earth several times, before they decided to reduce the scope of underground nuclear tests through negotiation. Today, the general explosive force of the nuclear arms in U.S. possession is more than 100 times stronger than China's recent limited nuclear test. This being the case, the United States should be the first to show restraint.

Working Hard To Ban Nuclear Tests in a Comprehensive Way

While verifying China has conducted a nuclear test, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reaffirmed China's persistent stand, indicating that all countries should realize the goal of banning nuclear testing in a comprehensive way within the range of effective nuclear disarmament.

Since its first successful nuclear test, China has guaranteed that it will never be the first to employ nuclear weapons at any time. China will not produce voluminous nuclear weapons that would pose threats to other countries. China already participates in the nonproliferation treaty, which bans the transfer of nuclear weapon technology to other countries.

The United States has always attached importance to the military deterrence of nuclear weapons, while paying special attention to such potentials of other countries. The United States has, for a long time, refused to make a commitment refraining from being the first to employ nuclear weapons; it has, for a long time, adopted a policy of "neither acknowledging nor denying" whether or not her Armed Forces stationed at foreign bases are equipped with nuclear weapons so that U.S. Armed Forces may pose the greatest threat under the condition of being unfathomable.

Some Science and Technology Can Be Applied to Peaceful Purposes

In the development of nuclear science and technology, China has in recent years paid greater attention to their peaceful utilization. China boasts a contingent of scientists and technicians of nuclear industry, a complete nuclear industrial system, and a tight nuclear-safety monitoring system, with quite significant accomplishments. Today, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shanghai are planning to build nuclear power plants. Some experts suggest augmenting overall planning and developing nuclear power plants with concentrated strength.

True, nuclear explosive test and nuclear power are two different kettles of fish. But some advanced science and technology can be applied to both purposes. That is conducive to improving China's economic competitiveness and is vitally important to the country's security. Those "overlapping" science and technology are worthy of development with concentrated strength. Earlier, some people from the State Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense suggested placing key technology for economic and defense purposes on a single listing in the state plan for the research and development of new hi-tech projects to promote the improvement in comprehensive national strength. This is a good idea with successful precedents overseas.

U.S., CIS Nuclear States Sign START Accord

OW2405020792 Beijing XINHUA in English
0116 GMT 24 May 92

[Text] Lisbon, May 23 (XINHUA)—The United States and the four former Soviet nuclear republics signed an

accord on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) here today.

After the signing by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the START treaty became a multinational document instead of a bilateral one.

The document was signed by U.S. President George Bush and former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on July 31, 1991, in Moscow, after some nine years of negotiations.

Under the treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States will cut their strategic nuclear weapons by one-third over seven years.

In the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, it became unclear who should be responsible for the implementation of the treaty.

All strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are to be transferred to Russia. The three countries have pledged to destroy offensive nuclear warheads on their soil within seven years, leaving Russia the only former Soviet republic possessing nuclear weapons.

NATO To Discuss Implementation of New Strategy

OW2505122592 Beijing XINHUA in English
1112 GMT 25 May 92

[Text] Brussels, May 25 (XINHUA)—Defense ministers from NATO member countries are expected to focus their discussion on how to implement the major decisions taken last year concerning NATO's new strategy and the restructuring of forces and commands, NATO sources said today.

At a combined meeting of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) scheduled for May 26 and 27, defense ministers will also analyse the political and strategic changes since the last DPC meeting and will consult each other on priorities in this context for the alliance, the sources said.

The ministers are expected to study the working plan adopted at the first joint DPC/NPG meeting with their counterparts of central and Eastern Europe which took place last April, the sources added.

The creation of a "Eurocorps" and the question of peacekeeping mission in Europe will also be on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of defense ministers.

The ministers will also evaluate progress in terms of nuclear weapons: The withdrawal of short-range nuclear forces.

Finally, in follow-up to a recent seminar, they will examine a report on the new structure of "crisis management" and the organization of exercises in a post-cold war situation, NATO sources said.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

SRV Official Views Ways To Achieve Security

BK2305173492 Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 22 May 92 p 2

[Text] Petaling Jaya, Thurs—Regional security must embrace military, economic and political spheres, Vietnam Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Dy Nien said today.

He said regional security could only be achieved when the security of each country in the region was maintained.

"It can also be reached on the basis of proper and balanced relations between the region and the big powers as well as others outside the region," he added.

In his paper, Global Changes and Regional Security presented at the International Symposium on Interaction for Progress—Modernisation of Vietnam and ASEAN Cooperation, Nguyen said regional security in the realms of military would constitute a big step forward if all the countries could proclaim a reasonable defence policy, dismantle foreign military bases and commit themselves not to conduct any military manoeuvres that went beyond the defence framework.

"We should also keep each other informed of such activities. And our military efforts should be made to ensure that never again will Southeast Asia return to the previous eras dominated by confronting alliances."

"Thus, if there is concerted effort by everyone, a new pattern of international relations can be created in this region which is capable of maintaining durable peace and stability."

Economically, Nguyen said countries in this region should strive for mutually beneficial cooperation.

"Certain concrete measures and mechanisms are to be worked out to promote mutual understanding, confidence and interaction among the regional States for the future of 'one single Southeast Asia,'" he added.

Vietnam on its part, he said, was committed to promoting all-round reforms for itself, especially on equal development of a multi-sector commodity economy.

On its foreign policy, he said, it was one geared towards independence, self-reliance and diversity as well as striving new friendships.

Philipine Ambassador to Malaysia Rodolfo Severino Jr in his paper, Towards a Regional Consensus: On Regional Security, said the process and object of consensus-building in the region should focus on:

—The goal of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality for Southeast Asia. This has acquired greater relevance and the prospects of its realisation have considerably improved, and,

—The draft treaty on a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Southeast Asia which an ASEAN group put together five years ago.

Severino Jr also said the atmosphere of confrontation within and around the region had largely dissipated and thus, it would be a good time to step up efforts in developing conflict-resolving and confidence-building measures.

JAPAN

'Concern' Expressed Over Chinese Nuclear Test

OW2605081592 Tokyo KYODO in English 0755 GMT 26 May 92

[Text] Tokyo, May 26 KYODO—Japan has expressed concern to China over the major underground nuclear test it conducted last week, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday.

Spokesman Masamichi Hanabusa told foreign correspondents the message of concern was conveyed Monday to the Chinese Foreign Ministry by the Japanese Embassy in Beijing.

"We attach a great deal of importance to this question of a nuclear test ban and the continuation of such testing is regrettable," Hanabusa said.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Friday that China recently conducted an underground nuclear test. The United States said the 1-megaton blast, the largest ever carried out by China, took place last Thursday in western Xinjiang Province.

One megaton is equivalent to 1 million tons of TNT, or 70 times the explosive power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1949 during the final days of World War II.

The Chinese test was far in excess of 150-kiloton limit set by the 1974 nuclear threshold test-ban treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear powers Britain and France, while not signatories, have pledged to adhere to the treaty guidelines.

The Chinese test came amid a moratorium by Russia and France on nuclear testing. The U.S. continues testing, but has criticized China for exceeding the 150-kiloton level.

Russian Remarks on Troop Withdrawal Welcomed

OW2705060392 Tokyo KYODO in English 0542 GMT 27 May 92

[Text] Tokyo, May 27 KYODO—Japan welcomes a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman's confirmation of President Boris Yeltsin's stated intention to withdraw all troops from a group of disputed islands, a Foreign Ministry source said Wednesday.

But the source said Japan is still concerned over an earlier statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which said that a withdrawal of the estimated 7,000 troops is "still under consideration."

A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman told a press conference Tuesday that Yeltsin's remarks to Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe in Moscow on May 4 take precedence over Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's remarks May 19 that Russia would not withdraw all its troops from the islands off Hokkaido.

Japanese officials said Grachev's remarks contradicted a pledge made by Yeltsin to Watanabe that all troops on the islands would be withdrawn, except for border guards, within one or two years as a step toward a resolution of the decades-old territorial issue.

Yeltsin told Watanabe that Moscow is ready to begin implementing the third stage of his five-stage plan to resolve the territorial dispute. The third stage is demilitarization of the islands.

The Russian Foreign Ministry on Friday issued a written statement saying a total withdrawal from the islands "is still under consideration."

It also said Yeltsin's remarks to Watanabe on the prospective troop pullout were merely a "prediction," rather than a "plan," an apparent indication that they did not constitute a pledge.

The statement further said Yeltsin's remarks were not made in the context of bilateral negotiations over the islands, which were seized by Soviet troops at the end of World War II. Japan is demanding their return as a condition for a peace treaty.

"We may continue to raise this question in a broader context because we really want those troops out from our islands," the Foreign Ministry source said.

He added that Japan will seek to clarify the various statements made in connection with the issue and from time to time ask about the current state of the troop withdrawal.

Grachev, after being named by Yeltsin as Russia's new defense minister, told a gathering in Moscow that considering the geostrategic interests of the Russian Army, "Russian troops will not withdraw from the Kuril Islands claimed by Japan."

The source said the various conflicting statements could reflect internal confusion in the Russian Government and ignorance of recent developments in bilateral relations on the part of Grachev.

Japan has repeatedly called for a removal of the troops from the territories—Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai group of islets. It refuses to give Russia economic assistance until it recognizes Japanese sovereignty over the islands.

POLAND**Skubiszewski Summarizes Troop Talks With Russia**

*LD2405023292 Warsaw PAP in English 2059 GMT
23 May 92*

[Text] Warsaw, May 23—Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski described the just-ended Moscow visit by President Lech Walesa as an opening of an entirely new chapter in relations with Russia.

"We now have the issue of troop withdrawal from Poland fully agreed, something which we did not have so far," he went on. This is an important achievement, but a short-term issue, while what really matters is the (beginning of a) long-term policy of very good relations and cooperation with Russia, Skubiszewski said. As an example of such policy the minister gave the agreement signed in Moscow on contacts with the Kaliningrad region.

Speaking to journalists on his return to Poland, Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski said that the treaty signed in Moscow created a solid framework for the development of Polish-Russian relations. Skubiszewski told reporters that negotiations with the Russian side on the withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Union from Poland had continued up to the last moment. But he noted with satisfaction that an issue "on which I have worked since my first months in office" is now settled.

Skubiszewski said that the main aim of Poland's eastern policy was clear. Poland will do all within her limited means to ensure stability and build cooperation throughout the region. "Poland will not become involved in the conflicts between the republics of the former Soviet Union," he stressed.

Skubiszewski emphasized that the visit was a personal success for President Lech Walesa, particularly in the "face to face" negotiations with President Yeltsin. "I cannot imagine a better defender of Poland's interests (in these negotiations) than President Lech Walesa," he said.

ROMANIA**PRR Wants 14th Army Withdrawal From Moldova**

*AU2205120892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0952 GMT 22 May 92*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 22/5/1992—In a communique the Republican Party of Romania [PRR] expresses its indignation over the militarist, war policy practiced by the Russian Federation through the 14th Army in Transnistria which has violently and ostentatively [as received] passed to using mass destruction weapons and modern technique against Moldova's civil population and militia troops.

This violation of the international law principles and of international conventions, the communique reads, in which Russia is also involved, proves clearly that the end of cold war and military aggression is still an illusion. Some former great powers being unable to get accustomed to positive roles in international life are always ready to impose their policy of dictation and even conquer by force.

To stop the bloodshed the Republican Party demands: the urgent and unconditioned withdrawal of the 14th Russian Army from the Republic of Moldova's territory; the calling up of the UN Security Council at the same time with the organization of an international inquiry; the application of economic sanctions against the Russian Federation to cover the aggressive actions of an army belonging to it; the introduction in Moldova of UN military observers besides the existing ones; firm interventions of Romania's Government and Parliament on an international plane to settle immediately the conflict before the evolutions could take an irreversible course.

The party also demands the politicians, men of letters and scientists in Russia, all those understanding what is happening in Moldova to intervene to avoid the creation of feelings of hatred and intolerance between two neighbor peoples and nations which have so many things in common in their old history.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Defense Council Rules Out Reducing Armed Forces

PA2705022192 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish
1940 GMT 26 May 92

[Text] Guatemala City, 26 May (NOTIMEX)—The Central American Defense Council (Condeca) on 26 May ruled out the possibility of reducing the armies in the region as long as arms trafficking, which threatens regional security, continues.

Guatemalan General Jose Domingo Garcia Samayoa, Condeca President, announced security measures will be taken at the Guatemalan, Salvadoran, Honduran, and Nicaraguan borders to prevent arms trafficking that could endanger democracy in those countries. In a statement to NOTIMEX, Garcia Samayoa said that Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras are studying the implementation of a mechanism to neutralize the "indiscriminate trafficking" of MAG M-60 machine guns, AK-47 and G-3 rifles, Chinese grenade launchers, and mortars. Gen. Garcia Samayoa, also the Guatemalan Defense Minister, said that "we cannot be talking about reductions while the threat of drug and arms trafficking persists."

Military sources told NOTIMEX that approximately 147,000 men comprise the Guatemalan, Salvadoran, Honduran, and Nicaraguan Armies which, according to Garcia Samayoa, are "defensive, and not offensive."

Guatemala has about 45,000 soldiers. Last year, however, instead of reducing the Army, the Defense Ministry mentioned the possibility of increasing that number to

85,000 men. Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano has said that the Guatemalan Army will not be reduced until the internal war is over.

In El Salvador, according to the peace agreements, the government will reduce its Armed Forces by 50 percent within a period of 24 months starting in February of this year. The number of troops will be reduced from 63,175 to a little over 31,000 during that period.

The Honduran Armed Forces, which have 26,000 trained men and are supplied with U.S. weapons, are against a reduction. They argue that it is not possible because of the struggle against drug trafficking, the continuation of the war in Guatemala, and because peace in El Salvador has not yet been consolidated.

Despite the decision announced by Honduran President Rafael Leonardo Callejas and Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani that the border dispute will be resolved peacefully, the armies in both countries remain on alert.

Meanwhile, the Sandinist People's Army [EPS] has 21,000 soldiers, less than a quarter of its size when President Violeta de Chamorro took office in April 1990. During the worst years of the Nicaraguan war, the EPS had more than 100,000 men.

A military source told NOTIMEX that UNICEF recommended to Condeca a reduction in the number of soldiers, particularly in Guatemala. However, Garcia Samayoa said the recommendation was for countries where the number of soldiers is higher than what international regulations stipulate.

Despite the severe economic crisis affecting some 12 million people in Central America, the governments are reluctant to reduce their armies and military budgets, arguing that "they need to consolidate regional peace and protect democratic institutions."

INDIA

New Delhi Reiterates Call for Nuclear Test Ban

*BK2205133092 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 1230 GMT 22 May 92*

[Text] India has reiterated its call for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon test. Responding to a query on yesterday's nuclear test by China, a spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said that New Delhi earnestly hopes that all states, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, will move toward concluding such a ban at the earliest. As already reported, China conducted a powerful underground nuclear test in the northern part of the country yesterday.

PAKISTAN

Paper Notes PRC Stance on Nuclear Test

*BK2405103992 Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 24 May 92 p 10*

[Editorial: "China Defiant"]

[Text] China has exploded a nuclear device of a million tons of TNT at Lop Nor and the shock-waves from it have reached Washington. Beijing has rejected the American protest against the explosion (it was many times bigger than the ceiling agreed in a previous Soviet-U.S. treaty) by saying that China is not bound by any treaty about tests. It has also stated that its promised signatures to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have not actually been affixed, and therefore no other nuclear regime is applicable to it under law. The Chinese spokesman has also revived his country's old stand that all nuclear-weapon states should get together to renounce testing to get China to stop its own testing. China is considered one of the five powers whose nuclear arsenals are considered legitimate, but it has not signed the NPT. After France signed it earlier this year, China remains the only nuclear power outside of the ambit of the NPT regime meant to restrain export of bomb technology. Last year, China had agreed to sign two treaties to reassure the Western world that its nuclear arsenal was not for export: the NPT and MTC (Missile Technology Control). This promise seemed to be in return for the Most Favoured Nation status granted to it in the U.S. on whom it has a 14 billion dollars of trade surplus, in addition to a two billion dollar surplus against EC. Thereafter, the Western pressure on Beijing to open up its domestic market to American and Western exports had mounted; the U.S. had also targeted China under its Trade Law to force it to pay for the patents and other intellectual property it was using. It now appears that

China has decided to defy the pressure. It seems to believe that the international environment evolving today is not friendly towards it, and that its security might be threatened by a policy of persistent submission to pressures from outside. While the Chinese leadership is steadily adopting free-market mechanisms to improve the country's economy, it is threatened by internal calls for more democratic freedom. Seeing the upheavals caused by democratisation and free market in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, it may be fearing similar upheavals in regions inhabited by non-Chinese populations after the loosening of the central control by its communist leadership.

This is a reversal to the post-Gulf war Western policy of international arms control. China's ambiguous stance on the NPT will strengthen the Indian resolve to stand aside from it unless the NPT gives it nuclear power status. Its stance on the universal removal of nuclear arsenals and test ban is similar to China's. New Delhi has shocked the West by the successful launching of its first space vehicle and is poised to test its intermediate range missile Agni which can carry nuclear payload. India too has been under pressure from the West and the U.S. to renounce its nuclear ambitions, stop the development of missiles and pay for American patents under the trade law. Pakistan, which fears war with India, has also been defying the American pressure to unilaterally renounce its nuclear ambitions and open its programme to full safeguards under the NPT. The deadlock was sought to be resolved through a five-power multilateral conference on a nuclear regime for South Asia which India has been rejecting so far. The pressure behind this multilateral conference was built up through a consensus reached by Washington with Russia and China. Russians too are beginning to get out of this consensus by refusing to accept an American embargo on the export of its missiles to India. This "revolt" may have adverse effect on the readiness of North Korea to open all its nuclear installations to inspection, which it has so far refused. Two instances of nuclear renunciation, one by South Africa and the other recently by Kazakhstan, might therefore not take root as precedents in the policy of freeing the world of proliferation. China's latest stance seems to be a defiant answer to excessive manipulation by the Americans in the realm of Chinese economic policy and politics of democracy. At home, the American President is facing an increasingly angry electorate which connects domestic economic decline to Washington's excessive involvement abroad under the rubric of New World Order. The world seems to prove that the bipolar cold war era is gradually giving way to a multipolar era without any rules of the game. The coming years promise a great deal of disturbance as global trade gets divided among blocs and some countries endeavour to realise their big power dreams in various regions.

GENERAL

Options for Warhead Elimination Examined

PM2005135992 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian No. 10 (56), 15 May 92 p 2

[“Expert’s Opinion” article by Major General, Retired, Vladimir Belous, senior scientific associate of the Center for Strategic Studies and RAU-Corporation expert: “The Nuclear Bomb’s Funeral. The Elimination of Nuclear Warheads Appears as Complex as Their Development”]

[Text] Russia and the United States must decommission and eliminate thousands of warheads. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the U.S. tactical nuclear forces number 7,147 weapons [boyezaryad], and the corresponding CIS forces number 11,305. In the event of their commitments being honored, the United States will be left with 1,800 aviation bombs in service, and Russia with 3,100. Thus Russia will have to destroy about 8,000 tactical warheads and the United States about 5,500. Taking into account the strategic munitions which have to be eliminated under the START Treaty, each side will have to dismantle more than 10,000 weapons.

In this process, the eliminators will have to tackle devices with an exceptionally high degree of potential danger, and this will require the use of specialized equipment, comprehensively tested technology, high standards of production, and strictest compliance with safety requirements. This will make it necessary to develop a special enterprise or a major branch of the plant where obsolete munitions are now being dismantled.

According to estimates by eminent U.S. nuclear physicist T. Taylor, the daily throughput of such a plant will not exceed six to eight warheads per 24 hours. The cost of constructing the plant and of transporting and dismantling nuclear warheads will amount to about \$2 billion.

According to estimates by U.S. experts, by the late eighties each side’s warheads contained about 100 tonnes of plutonium and 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium.

Technically speaking, the task of utilizing weapons-grade uranium (containing more than 90 percent uranium-235) is relatively simple to solve by diluting it with natural uranium down to a 3-5 percent concentration. The resultant material provides fuel for nuclear power station [AES] reactors. The utilization of weapons-grade uranium for these purposes could ultimately yield a considerable economic effect, but initially it would require solid expenditure on the development of new production units. Russia’s current stocks of uranium

needed for AES reactors will make it possible to release onto the world market the uranium extracted from weapons—once it has been depleted, of course. But the market is dominated by the United States, which supplies about 50 percent of the total volume of uranium sold each year. The former USSR accounts for about 6-7 percent of the uranium market, even though its share of confirmed uranium reserves in the world accounts for 45 percent. The United States, together with two European consortiums, is trying to curb Russia’s uranium sales potential. False reports on embezzlement and illegal export of fissile materials outside Russia, which periodically appear in the foreign press, are meant to sow mistrust and to prevent a consolidation of Russia’s positions in the world market.

But the utilization of plutonium presents the most complex scientific and technical problem. One of the ways to utilize it is to mix it with natural uranium and subsequently produce fuel elements for AES reactors. But the development of industrial AES’s operating on such fuel also presents certain difficulties due to the complexity of controlling such a reactor’s operations.

At present neither the United States nor Russia has industrial reactors operating on plutonium. There are, however, research reactors and power plant reactors operating on plutonium fuel.

Other proposals have also been made regarding the future of weapons-grade plutonium. In particular, it is proposed to mix the plutonium with nuclear reactors’ radioactive waste and to subsequently entomb it in special depositories. But this way of eliminating this expensive substance is inexpedient both economically and ecologically. It must be borne in mind that the period of plutonium’s half-decay is 24,000 years, and consequently we will be leaving the solution of this problem to many generations of our offspring.

Another proposal envisages the destruction of munitions containing plutonium by using a nuclear charge explosion in a special cave dug at great depth. Under the effect of high temperature, this will produce a destruction of weapons, partial fission of fissile materials, and subsequent vitrification of the entire melted-down radioactive mass.

Proposals have even been made to fly the plutonium beyond the Solar System using powerful booster rockets.

At present, however, the most preferable method is to develop special facilities to store plutonium under strict international verification. At the same time, it is necessary to pool the efforts by scientists from the world’s leading countries to elaborate methods for its utilization and develop reliable models of industrial reactors using plutonium as fuel.

Yablokov Faults Calls for Nuclear Development

*PM2205093192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 May 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Aleksey Yablokov, Russian Federation state counselor on policy in the sphere of ecology and health protection: "We Will Frighten Everyone So Much That We Will End Up Being Afraid of Ourselves"]

[Text] It has recently been asserted, in the pages of many newspapers, that we should develop our atomic industry at least to the same extent as used to happen in the USSR—both as regards nuclear power stations [AES's], and as regards the development [razrabotka] of nuclear weapons. Here it is persistently emphasized that our atomic experts—the people who make atomic weapons and are associated with atomic power—are motivated exclusively by concern for the country's good and the people's good. "The people have trusted us, they have believed in our ability not just to create such awesome weapons, but also to exercise control over them. In my view, we have never yet abused that trust"—that is how nuclear weapon designer Radiy Ilkayev concludes an article in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA for 25 April 1992 under the heading "Portrait of a Nuclear Complex." And V.N. Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic energy, claims (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 7 May 1992) that nuclear weapons are a "defense of our free choice" of a path of progress "which is worthy of our people."

These statements by leaders of the nuclear industry are designed to convince us all of the correctness of the chosen course of developing the nuclear weapons complex. However, the development of this complex is not so much a technical problem as a political problem. No political problem can be discussed solely by a small group of specialists. I am therefore obliged not only to draw attention to contentious assertions by our esteemed nuclear experts, but also to examine a number of questions that have not attracted their attention, but are important in resolving the entire problem.

As R. Ilkayev rightly noted, atomic weapons and power are "twin brothers," with a shared history and a shared radiation danger to all life. And basically with shared economic and philosophical problems. Elitism and secrecy have always characterized people working in the nuclear weapon complex. But what is far more important is that their actions have immeasurably greater significance for the future of mankind than the edicts of the most formidable dictator (the price of the actions of a few people at Chernobyl was the ruined lives of many millions!). That is why, in theory, atomic experts should have no right to make mistakes. Unfortunately, experience shows that atomic experts, like the rest of us, can make mistakes, can be wrong, and can even tell trivial lies, dragging all of us into an even more terrible, planet-wide Chernobyl.

The designers of the famous RBMK [high-power pressure tube] reactors deceived us when they claimed that AES's with these reactors are safe. But they knew about

the dangers! And they still insisted on building them. They know that even now we have no safe reactors. But again they insist on continuing to build AES's. They know that the problem of the burial of radioactive waste has not been solved, that when the life of an AES is over, dismantling it and reducing it to a "green field" costs the kind of resources that we are not going to have in the foreseeable future. And they still insist on the development of the nuclear power industry.

For the record: Before an AES whose life is over can be dismantled, it has to be mothballed for decades. Throughout the period of mothballing, apart from duty specialists, the AES also needs heat and electricity. After that, when just one reactor is dismantled, it will be necessary to remove elsewhere and to bury some 40,000 tonnes of metal structures and 400,000 tonnes of concrete. The designers know that if all this work, plus expenditure on the burial of radioactive waste, is added to the cost of the AES, cost recovery will prove mythical. They know that, yet they insist on building them, deferring the solving of all these problems to future generations of Russian people. Are we morally entitled to do this? Are we entitled to let the genie out of the bottle if we do not know how to put it back in?

A few years ago, as one of a group of experts, I visited the South Ukrainian AES. We asked the director how often there are failures [nedoladki] in their operation. The answer was simple: It does not happen. But someone had the bright idea of asking why bonuses were paid to groups of maintenance workers whose names appeared on the honor board. And the director had to admit publicly that failures occur regularly and have to be heroically eliminated, for which bonus payments have to be made.

The atomic experts' lie was also heard in the summer of 1989 at parliamentary hearings on the Kyshtym accident of 1957. Are all the people irradiated during that terrible explosion of radioactive waste at the Chelyabinsk "Mayak" combine being kept under medical observation? Yes, we were told, all without exception. And the results of these observations, formulated in graphs and tables, were not at all terrifying. At that time we, the members of the Ecology Committee of the former USSR Supreme Soviet, did not yet know that a significant proportion of the irradiated population had been forcibly shipped out and dispersed across the country.

Our nuclear experts' utterances are striking for their unshakable conviction that they are right. This conviction does not allow them to examine their own problems objectively.

For example, the "hottest" issue at the moment is that of nuclear tests. First they tell us that the question of continuing tests is a political one. Then they say to us that the tests are necessary from a purely technical viewpoint (as a safety check). Finally, V.N. Mikhaylov clearly contradicts this when he writes: "Of course, in order to provide guarantees against unexpected political

or technical events...it is necessary to secure by international treaty an annual minimum number of tests..." No matter whether a political decision is made, whether new techniques are found for monitoring [proverka] safety—in any event, our nuclear experts must have guarantees that tests will continue! Why so? In order to "prevent the decay of unique collectives of highly skilled professionals." How does this approach differ from the much maligned departmental approaches? On the basis of this principle decades were spent constructing bigger and bigger power stations and digging grander and grander canals—to avoid dispersing the established collectives of construction workers!

Maybe the time has come to tell our outstandingly gifted nuclear experts: "Thank-you, my friends, you have done the important job well, now venture into other areas!" In fact, it appears this process has already begun. As is known, the most active and skilled cadres are quitting the development of nuclear weapons. Indeed, need we fear "irreversible decay," or, rather, the fundamental restructuring of our nuclear weapons complex, if the weapons we already have can destroy the entire world population many times over?

The claim that verification [kontrol] techniques need to be improved is extremely controversial. As an analogy I would remind you of the long debate about monitoring [kontrol] bacteriological weapons production. In the end it became clear to everyone that the process was unmonitorable. So a solution was found: Under a 1991 law actions of that kind became a criminal offense in the United States. This outstandingly important legal act marks a new era in legal relationships, and maybe even a new stage in the history of mankind: a national representative authority's recognition of a global level of responsibility.

V.N. Mikhaylov talks of the possibility of "safe" underground nuclear explosions. There is no such thing. Not just because we do not know all the consequences of nuclear explosions (radiobiological, geophysical, climatic, hydrogeological, and others). When nuclear devices were detonated above soldiers near Orenburg in the fifties and hundreds of other nuclear devices were exploded in the atmosphere at the Novaya Zemlya and Semipalatinsk test sites, even the most eminent scientists claimed at the time that all the consequences were already known. We now know they were mistaken: Many future generations will suffer the consequences of these explosions.

There are still those who think nuclear explosions deep in the permafrost are safe. But how do you explain the cases of leukemia in children in the Vilyuy basin? You need only look at the map of geophysical contours of the series of nuclear explosions in the seventies on Russian territory to see that the effect of a single explosion is traceable over a distance of several thousand kilometers.

We are assured that "nuclear tests are the basis of the country's scientific and technical potential." In my view, this claim is an insult to the country that gave the world Dokuchayev and Vernadskiy, Pavlov and Mechnikov,

Timofeyev-Resovskiy and Krylov, Tsiolkovskiy and Vavilov, Shubnikov and Karpinskiy, Zhukovskiy and Lyapunov. And many other thinkers whose pupils in fact comprise the scientific and technical potential that will provide for the future development of agriculture, medicine, biotechnology, and the national economy in general, and not only its military sector.

Let us be honest and admit that the nuclear genie attracts our attention because it has in it a power that is mysterious to man, that he has not mastered. As a scientist, I am well aware that the human learning process is infinite and there is no task more magical for the researcher than that of stepping into the unknown. But in the case of nuclear tests we have reached the point where the researcher has to stop. This has to be done not just for political and ethical reasons (as A.D. Sakharov did, for example), but also for economic reasons. After all, it costs several billion rubles per year to continue nuclear tests. And the nuclear explosions do not mean that there is more on the shelves; in fact, there is less.

V.N. Mikhaylov's position as head of our nuclear weapons complex gives rise to a whole series of serious political, economic, and ecological questions. For example, how is one supposed to read, for example, the claim that "nuclear weapons are today first and foremost a means of maintaining global...economic stability"? Why is the prohibition of nuclear weapons development an "alternative to nuclear equilibrium"? How can one use the existence of unstable political regions and aggressive neighbors as justification for the need to use nuclear weapons? And how is one supposed to take the thesis of the possible continuation of nuclear explosions outside the nuclear test sites? Are we actually going to revert to the practice of nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes—in Yakutia, near Astrakhan, Orenburg, Irkutsk, Chita, Naryan-Mar, Tomsk, and Kostroma? Finally, why, if we regard nuclear weapons as a deterrent factor, must we endeavor to create more and more new versions of them, including "ecologically cleaner" ones? You would think that the "dirtier" and more awesome the weapon of deterrence, the less willing any aggressor would be to start a war. Indeed, there would be no winners in such a nuclear war. Let the Americans (if they have the spare billions of dollars) invent ultra-accurate and ecologically cleaner nuclear munitions. Our hundreds of ecologically dirty and not particularly accurate nuclear weapons may be sufficient to deter anyone.

I must not ignore two political aspects of V.N. Mikhaylov's article which are important for an appreciation of my opponents' logic. In the first place, they make no distinction between Russia and the USSR. The Russian minister writes about cutting the program "from 15 tests per year on average in the country's two test sites to four tests." But on the territory of my country—Russia—there is only one nuclear test site, and in 1964-1990 on average two tests per year were carried out there by the former Union departments. Now the minister is proposing doubling the number of tests on the territory of Russia!

Second, the Russian Federation has not yet conducted a single nuclear test of its own. Nuclear tests used to be conducted by the USSR Defense Ministry and USSR

Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The fact that Russia is the USSR's legal heir does not at all mean that we have to work on all the strategic military programs the Union was working on.

Does the Russian president have to assume the awesome responsibility of starting Russian nuclear tests? I would add that, as far as I know, there is as yet no legislatively approved mechanism for authorizing nuclear tests. In the USSR this mechanism comprised a decision by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the mysterious Military-Industrial Commission. In the United States this principled decision is made by parliament. Our parliament has so far kept out of the political discussion of nuclear strategy issues.

Let me sum up. The USSR nuclear weapons complex must not be revived in Russia unaltered. Its program needs to be not just cut, but radically revised. The president, parliament, and government must decide whether we really need new types of weapons? In the conditions of our disbalanced economy can we satisfy the research interests of some of our scientists by conducting ultraexpensive nuclear explosions? Are the nuclear weapons we already have not enough to deter all and sundry for many, many years to come?

We have to know why we or the United States need to create new nuclear weapon systems. Maybe to threaten one another or other countries? If it is not for this, but for "technical progress" and for the purpose of developing scientific thought, then is it not better to do all this in conjunction with the United States, France, Britain, China, and the other nuclear countries? It would certainly be cheaper and safer for all countries, and progress would be far more significant.

Finally, all the aforesaid should not be seen as an appeal for unilateral nuclear disarmament and the destruction of our nuclear defense complex. All I am calling for is an end to the development of a third generation of nuclear weapons that is politically meaningless in the modern world, and thus for an end to the new round of the arms race, which only benefits military-industrial circles, not states and peoples—Russia, the United States, and others.

Norwegian Conference Discusses Dismantlement, Conversion

LD2005224892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1734 GMT 19 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Loskutov]

[Text] Oslo, 19 May (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Atomic Energy Minister Mikhaylov was received today by Norway's Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. After their meeting a joint news conference took place, at which the ministers replied to journalists' questions.

The head of Norway's foreign policy department, having stressed the importance and usefulness of the conversation, noted that Norway is ready to cooperate with Russia in matters of nuclear safety, which were discussed at the conference in Stavanger, in particular in training Russian specialists working on the Kola Peninsula at the Norwegian nuclear reactor in the town of Halden. Moreover, Norway will give grants to Russian scientific cadres and will give assistance in setting up scientific research centers in Moscow and Kiev in order to retrain nuclear specialists.

T. Stoltenberg voiced satisfaction at the progress made with regard to sending Norwegian experts on fact-finding missions to nuclear power stations on the Kola Peninsula. Such a delegation, he said, may be sent very soon.

Answering a question about the burial of highly toxic nuclear waste by means of an underground nuclear explosion, V. Mikhaylov explained that there are no plans to do that. There is only a project to devise mathematical modelling of the processes, and to conduct laboratory experiments with microscopic doses of an ordinary chemical explosive. The project will be completed by the end of 1993 and submitted to Russian and international experts. No nuclear explosions will therefore be carried out in order to destroy chemical and radioactive waste before an expert study has been made, which might apparently take place in 1994, V. Mikhaylov stressed.

For his part, Mikhaylov cast doubt on the positive results of work on the project owing to difficulties of a scientific and technical nature.

Mikhaylov Addresses 'Closed Cities'

LD1905185792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1811 GMT 19 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Loskutov]

[Text] Oslo May 19 TASS—An international conference on military conversion is now under way in Stavanger (Norway), focusing on the state of the Russian nuclear industry and prospects for the lengthening of the moratorium on nuclear tests on the Russian Novaya Zemlya test site.

Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister for nuclear industry and head of the Russian delegation to the conference, attended by over a hundred experts from Norway, Russia, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and observers from other European and Asian countries, addressed the conference on Tuesday [19 May].

Mikhaylov said the Russian Government was planning to lift restrictions on visits to the so-called "closed" cities as their defence plants are gradually converted to civilian production. The output of military hardware is expected to be reduced two times by the year 1995.

Russia is encouraging Western interest in Russian high technologies, excluding the proliferation of nuclear technologies.

Russia has not yet sold a single nuclear warhead or enriched uranium, Mikhaylov pointed out.

Mikhaylov said the Russian Government gives priority to the safety of nuclear power stations and reliable utilisation of nuclear waste formed as a result of dismantling nuclear plants.

A total of 17 billion U.S. dollars will be allocated to improve the nine active nuclear power stations. According to Mikhaylov, four nuclear reactors used exclusively for military purposes will be dismantled, two of them in 1992, and the other two in the near future.

According to the Norwegian Telegraph Agency, Mikhaylov did not conceal that Russia was continuing the production of nuclear warheads, but at the same time Mikhaylov pointed out that many more warheads are being dismantled than produced, and the production of enriched uranium was stopped.

As for the moratorium on nuclear tests in Novaya Zemlya, Mikhaylov said it can be extended till the end of this year and, perhaps, through the next year. Mikhaylov said that would depend on the results of bilateral talks between Russia and the United States.

However, a final decision on the moratorium will be adopted by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in October 1992, Mikhaylov said.

Mikhaylov noted the Russian Government was not planning to destroy chemical ammunition and radioactive waste by nuclear explosions. The nuclear test site in Novaya Zemlya is in the competence of the Russian Defence Ministry which can give permission to foreign experts to visit.

Mikhaylov believes Scandinavian experts may also receive permission to inspect the area.

Moratorium Extension Predicted

PM2005111692 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
19 May 92 p 5

[Report by Trond Bo: "Will Extend Nuclear Test Moratorium"]

[Text] Stavanger— Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov said that he is interested in extending the agreement on a moratorium on nuclear tests, if other countries follow suit. The Russians have also said yes to allowing Norwegians to visit the test site on Novaya Zemlya.

At the opening of the Stavanger conference on Russia's closed nuclear cities Mikhaylov said that he is sure today that the moratorium will be extended to the end of the

year and perhaps into next year. A final decision will be made by President Yeltsin before the moratorium runs out in October.

Nuclear safety, the disposal of nuclear waste, and nuclear tests were at the center of attention in Stavanger yesterday. Almost 100 delegates and a similar number of observers gathered for the first historic meeting of politicians and scientists from Russia and Western countries. Many of the delegates from Russia have not even met each other or their atomic energy minister before.

The fact that the meeting is taking place in Stavanger—outside Russia and in parallel with the celebration of 17 May [Norwegian national day]—was described by Mikhaylov as proof of the changes which have taken place in Russia. A few years ago it would have been an improbable dream for top-level Russian nuclear researchers to be allowed to travel abroad and meet with Western researchers.

"The Russians are showing an openness which is unique when it comes to discussing international environmental issues. They are not so good about following things up, and they have not the resources, but we must nevertheless continue to exert pressure to have Norwegian demands met," Foreign Ministry Under Secretary of State Jan Egeland said.

In his opening address to the meeting Egeland reiterated the Norwegian demand to be allowed to visit the nuclear test sites on Novaya Zemlya. Egeland told AFTENPOSTEN that he views Mikhaylov's speech as an invitation to the Norwegian authorities to exert pressure to be allowed to visit the sites. The Foreign Ministry will follow the matter up and contact the Defense Ministry in Moscow.

Today there are ten closed cities constructed around research centers and plants which produce nuclear arms, among other things.

Some 700,000 people live in these cities, which are spread throughout Russia.

According to Mikhaylov, Yeltsin is planning a gradual opening of these cities as they are converted to civilian research and production. According to the plans, military production in these cities is to be halved before 1995, and Mikhaylov hopes that Western industry might be interested in new Russian technology. Mikhaylov said that Russia has not sold a single nuclear warhead or any enriched uranium to other countries. Now the safety at existing nuclear power stations and the safe storage of nuclear arms are being given priority. Russia will spend \$17 billion on the modernization of its nuclear power stations. Today there is no production of enriched uranium for military purposes, and four of the thirteen reactors which are used for this purpose will be shut down as soon as possible, two this year and the next two in a few years' time.

News Conference on Tashkent Summit

*LD2005135792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1320 GMT 20 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow, May 20 TASS—Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov told a news conference here today about his satisfaction with the results of the Tashkent summit: “In my capacity as commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, I am pleased with its results as they make me optimistic about the Commonwealth's future”.

Shaposhnikov told the news conference in the Russian Foreign Ministry's press centre that the signing of the Treaty of Collective Security was a success of the summit as it provided the basis for the existence of the Commonwealth Joint Forces at the present stage. He also stressed the importance of the agreements on the use of air space, on the procedure of maintaining and using space infrastructure facilities, on chemical weapons, on cuts in the ex-Soviet Armed Forces, on law enforcement agencies in the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and its member countries, on principles and procedure of implementing the agreement on conventional arms and armaments in Europe.

On the latter agreement, Shaposhnikov said that the summit specified figures and quotas mutually agreeable to all countries concerned.

As concerns the special standpoints of Ukraine and Byelarus on the collective security agreement, Marshal Shaposhnikov noted that Byelarus had no objection of principle to signing it, pending the approval of the republic's parliament. As for Ukraine, the outlook is less optimistic. Ukraine has proclaimed it will abide by the status of a neutral, non-nuclear and non-bloc country, so it is not likely to sign the agreement, Shaposhnikov said.

He also noted that, aiming to reach a parity of the forces involved in the conflict in the Trans-Caucasian region, the sides concerned were seeking to ensure that each of the involved countries, including Georgia, should have the same amounts of equipment and armaments.

On the situation in the Dniestr region, the marshal noted that in the emotional upheaval there, the Dniestr forces had seized several munitions items from the 14th Army. But the Army that is subordinate to Russia, is sticking to neutrality, he stressed.

Aleksandr Mochaykin, chairman of the coordinating committee of officer assemblies in the Commonwealth Forces, said, when asked about the attitude to the Dniester conflict among the ranks, that the coordinating committee had a stance of its own. Most officers held the view that the land should not be given away to anyone. Should Romania intervene in the conflict, many officers will volunteer to go to the region, he said.

CIS Defense Ministers Hold Meeting in Moscow**Shaposhnikov on 14th Army**

*LD2605130692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 26 May 92*

[From the “Novosti” newscast]

[Text] Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, assembled a meeting of defense ministers of Commonwealth countries in Moscow today. Questions of the structure of the CIS Joint Armed Forces command and of nuclear weapons are being discussed. Our information today is that of the Commonwealth Republics Russia has 15,000 nuclear weapons, Ukraine has 6,000, and Byelarus has 2,000; Kazakhstan has 1,200.

[Unidentified correspondent] The heads of the military departments of 10 republics have gathered in the former headquarters of the Warsaw Pact to make amendments to the common military policy in connection with the signing of the collective security treaty in Tashkent. As you know, so far only six of the eleven countries in the CIS are members of this treaty. Not present at the session are the ministers of defense of Azerbaijan and Moldova. The Georgian defense minister is taking part as an observer.

For the time being the generals and marshals of the sovereign republics wear the same uniform and insignia, but this is not the most burdensome legacy of the former Soviet Army—there remain the nuclear weapons and the single antimissile and antiaircraft defense system, the system for identification of friend and foe, and other military devices requiring detailed coordination.

Judging by all accounts, participants in the meeting are inclined to constructive debate. Ultimately, the fate of the meetings of CIS heads of state in Moscow on 6 July depends on just how successful their work is.

The strategic forces guaranteeing our security against an enemy without are under control. But war has come upon us from within. There is no hindrance to conventional weapons from army arsenals getting into the hands of partisan formations. Soldiers and officers are abandoning subordination to their commanders in crisis situations. Will these problems be discussed?

[Begin video recording of interview with Marshal Shaposhnikov] These will be discussed individually. They will not be discussed at as big a conference as this. I have, specifically, sent a letter to the president of Moldova and to the Dniester region leader, to the prime minister and the minister of defense of Moldova and to Netkachev, commander of the 14th Army, saying that the army has never ever been a destabilizing factor in Moldova. [end recording]

Future 'Composition' of Forces Noted

*LD2605173892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1621 GMT 26 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 26 May—The position of the Moldovan parliament and leadership on the Dniester conflict was not discussed at the Council of CIS Defense Ministers meeting today because that state's representative was absent, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, CIS commander in chief, told a news conference on the results of today's meeting.

News conference participants noted that the leaders of the CIS states' military departments initialled draft agreements and documents on the definitive composition of the CIS strategic forces, on systems for warning against missile attack [SWMA] and control of outer space, on air defense systems and radar identification of installations, and others. The structure and functions of the CIS forces high command in connection with the signing of the collective security treaty was discussed but not initialled.

Answering a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent on what tasks the CIS forces high command will tackle under the new conditions, Marshal Shaposhnikov said that his important tasks will include maintaining combat readiness at an appropriate level, the operational command of strategic forces, coordinating military issues of the treaty process, and the prevention and operational response to local conflicts which could possibly take place on the Commonwealth's outer borders.

The unified forces commander in chief also underlined that the list of units and formations which belong to the Commonwealth strategic forces and which is being discussed at present has been reduced to a minimum. In practice, what will be at issue in the future are nuclear forces, i.e. strategic rocket forces, the nuclear component of the Air Force, the Navy nuclear triad, the SWMA, and the space units. Thus, a great part of Air Force and Navy formations, including the Black Sea Fleet, will be withdrawn from the CIS strategic forces.

It has been decided that all the draft agreements that were discussed today will be put forward for finalization at the next meeting of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers on 3 July, the day before a CIS summit in Moscow.

News Conference Held

*LD2605194492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 26 May 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpts] Control of all nuclear strategic forces remains under the CIS Armed Forces joint command. Marshal Shaposhnikov, CIS Armed Forces commander in chief,

held a regular conference in Moscow today on the structure of the joint Armed Forces command, nuclear weapons, and the military's role in conflicts:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent V. Luskanov] The heads of the military departments of ten republics gathered in the former Warsaw Pact headquarters to revise overall military policy after the signing of the collective security treaty in Tashkent. Only six of the 11 CIS states are treaty members. The Azerbaijani and Moldovan defense ministers did not attend the session, and Georgia's deputy defense minister is attending as an observer. [passage omitted]

War has scorched us from within, and conventional weapons are finding their way—unhindered—into the hands of partisan formations. Soldiers and officers in crisis situations are moving away from the subordination of their commanders. Will these problems be discussed?

[Shaposhnikov] They will be discussed separately but not at a large conference like this. Among other things, I have written the Moldovan president, the leader of the Dniester region, the prime minister and defense minister of Moldova, and 14th Army Commander Netkachev to the effect that the army has never been a destabilizing factor in Moldova. [end recording]

Shaposhnikov Discusses Meeting

*LD2605230592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2010 GMT 26 May 92*

[Text] The defense ministers of the Commonwealth countries have held a conference in Moscow which was followed by a meeting with the press. All countries of the Commonwealth, except for Moldova, attended the conference. Due to the absence, the Council of Defense Ministers did not discuss the grave situation in Moldova. There was also an observer from Georgia in Moscow. At the request of Radio Moscow International, the commander in chief of the joint armed forces, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, described the meeting.

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording in Russian with superimposed translation into English] Firstly, it was a preparatory meeting before the next Commonwealth summit, due in Moscow on 6 July. We discussed a number of draft documents that would be finalized and later submitted to the chief coordinator and then the summit. Secondly, the meeting was another stage in building the joint armed forces. The most formidable and complicated question on the agenda was the structure and functions of the chief command of the joint armed forces considering the collective security treaty recently signed in Tashkent.

The general functions of the chief command should be the maintenance of the defense capability of the joint forces; operational command; the prevention of, and rapid response to local conflicts along the borders of the former Union, but not inside them, which was emphasized at the news conference.

Still the issue has not been finalized. Therefore, the military leaders decided to hold another meeting on the issue in Moscow on 3 July. Still the defense ministers practically fully agreed on a whole package of documents regulating the operation of such vital elements of the military infrastructure as the missile attack warning system, air defense, and some others. The structure of the strategic force of the Commonwealth was finalized. It will consist of a strategic missile force, airborne and naval nuclear components, the missile attack warning system, anti-missile defense, and part of a space force.

The Black Sea Fleet was not included in the list. Work on these documents will continue. [end recording]

Implications of New CIS Collective Security Pact Considered

*MK2605162392 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
26 May 92 p 4*

[Mikhail Shchipanov article under "Burning Issue" rubric: "From the Taiga to the Baltic"]

[Text] The past 10 days have rocked the fragile peace within the Commonwealth. The Russian Armed Forces led by the young minister, Pavel Grachev, are starting to emerge decisively from the shadow of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, which have in turn, following the six republics' conclusion of a collective security agreement, found themselves left in midair with Marshal Shaposhnikov's entire staff. Typically, the members of the new pact have not so far given rise to the former misgivings regarding an excessive "Asian slant," as was the case at the end of the drafting of the stillborn Union Treaty. Russia is clearly turning toward Asia, and statements like that of J. Delors, chairman of the EC Commission, to the effect that Russia is not Europe at all only increase the realization that the new eastward-oriented policy is the correct one.

For the time being the new defense community, in the best traditions of the CIS, is reminiscent of a "cloud in uniformed trousers" [reference to Mayakovskiy poem—indicates vague, woolly concept], just a matter of good, albeit official, intentions. However, the emergent set of bilateral "framework" treaties may make Russia a guarantor of stability and security in the vast region whose southern borders are marked by a whole series of "hot spots."

The main shots have now been fired regarding Armenia's membership of the pact; by its presence in the new defense community it is as it were setting the community against Azerbaijan. However, the main attention should be focused on the structure which may, I think, be closer to the NATO structure than to the Warsaw Pact. First, the "Six" ("Six" at the moment) need to consider the dismal experience of the defunct Warsaw Pact, which, unlike the North Atlantic alliance, was not "held together" by a political organization and for that reason suffered a monumental collapse following the suspension of exclusively military relations.

However, the nuclear scene may be the most interesting element in the life of the new pact. After Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine signed an additional protocol to the strategic offensive arms treaty in Lisbon Saturday [23 May], Kiev, Alma-Ata, and Minsk formally gave up their claims to nuclear weapons on their territory and the nuclear warheads acquired the status of "migrants." Thus, Russia, which is now the only nuclear power in the former Union, can put nuclear arms at the pact's disposal while keeping total control of their use.

In simpler terms, Moscow can provide nuclear guarantees for countries that have joined the "defense space" with it and, by way of security, can site its nuclear bases extraterritorially in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, for instance. As the Americans did for decades in Europe. In response the pact members would solemnly pledge not to try to acquire their own nuclear weapons despite the presence of nuclear China on their doorstep. Incidentally, some of the nuclear arms now to be destroyed in Kazakhstan could also be transferred to Russian jurisdiction and remain on the local steppes.

For the time being that option does indeed seem a little fantastic. But remember the indignant ineffaceable tears that were shed during the seventies when the United States began developing its mobile rapid-response forces; yet now the Russian Army is forming the same kind of subunits. Thus, there is convergence in the Army too, gentlemen!

Military Issues Given Priority

PM1805102592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 May 92 p 1

[Report by special correspondents Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafyev and Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin: "Boris Yeltsin: Military Issues Will Be My Priority at This Meeting"]

[Text] Tashkent—On the morning of 15 May the approaches to the Palace of Peoples' Friendship within a radius of almost 1 km were controlled by militiamen in snow-white shirts and by polite people in civilian dress. The caution of the meeting's hosts seemed excessive against the background of calm and cordial Tashkent. Toward 1000 the eminent guests began to arrive. Journalists seized their opportunity, trying to get just a couple of words out of the arriving presidents, premiers, and vice premiers.

Ukrainian Premier Vitold Fokin was preoccupied and unsmiling:

"There are no easy items on the agenda. But I believe that the most important thing is to answer the question dealing with the financial collapse of the CIS republics. I intend to submit a proposal that work be started straight off with an examination of the financial situation. As for the agreement on collective security, this will be resolved in the course of the discussion."

Georgian Premier Tengiz Sigua, who has been invited to the meeting of CIS heads of state, declared that he would support Ukraine's proposal. Let us remind you that the presidents of Uzbekistan and Belarus had expressed the same position the previous day.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin readily approached the journalists and was clearly in a good mood. He commented that it would not be a bad thing if just 10-12 of the 18 issues were examined.

"I will insist very strongly today," Boris Yeltsin said, "on the signing of the agreement on collective security. The draft treaty on collective security states, in particular, that in 'the event of aggression against one of the parties to it the rest will regard this as an act of aggression against them all.'"

The president singled out for himself the package of military issues as being the priority at this meeting.

Commenting on the talks with Islam Karimov to be held in Samarkand 16 May, Boris Yeltsin emphasized Russia's intention to "start up closer relations with Uzbekistan in all spheres."

We have learned from sources in the Russian delegation that the heads of Russia and Uzbekistan intend to discuss and, maybe, sign the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation.

To all appearances, the fate of the unified ruble area and the unified defense budget could well be resolved in Tashkent. Of course, the likelihood of this is directly dependent, in general, on the Commonwealth's ability to work out compromise agreements.

The summit meeting participants have to examine such important documents as the draft treaty on collective security, on the use of airspace, and on chemical weapons and the statement on the reduction of the Armed Forces of the former USSR and on the procedure for maintaining and utilizing projects of the space infrastructure.

The packages of questions have mainly been formulated by diplomats and military people. But whereas, according to a claim by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, the former had more points of contact than points of confrontation, the latter certainly were not in full agreement when they reached the presidential stage [of the summit]. The Ukrainian delegation, for example, hardly supported a single one of the military questions offered to the heads of state for signing, including one of such fundamental significance as the agreement on collective security.

We met with Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan, leader of the Ukrainian military delegation, and asked him to explain his position for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers.

"Yes," Gen. Bizhan said, "we really did consider it impossible to initial a number of questions. The agreement on chemical weapons, for example. Why must we finance their destruction, if there are no chemical weapons on Ukrainian territory and none have ever been produced there? Or take the agreement on collective security. As long ago as 1990 Ukraine declared its nonparticipation in any military alliances and blocs whatever. Particularly as this document does not oblige anyone to do anything and is of a general nature. Maybe, given the appropriate circumstances, we will enter into a military alliance, but there is no need for this at present. As for strategic forces, on 5 April a presidential decree transferred all military units stationed on the republic's territory to Ukrainian jurisdiction, including the strategic nuclear forces. But, I emphasize, the latter are subordinate to us only administratively (cadre appointments, conferment of ranks, resolution of social questions, etc.), while the commander of the strategic forces of the CIS Joint Armed Forces retains the operational management. Therefore Ukraine remains a nuclear-free power within the world community. Although I will emphasize that we no longer belong to the Joint Armed Forces. This is why the question of the unified defense budget was not examined."

In conclusion Gen. Bizhan remarked that the degree of mutual understanding among the defense ministers is growing from one meeting to the next, and this inspires optimism.

The session of the Council of CIS Heads of State in Tashkent was opened by President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Turkmenistan are represented at the highest level. The other Commonwealth countries have sent to the meeting plenipotentiary delegations headed by leaders of governments. Tengiz Sigua, member of the Georgian State Council Presidium, is present as an observer. President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has been elected to the chair of this summit meeting.

Delegates Describe Meeting

PM1505132992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 May 92 pp 1,3

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafyev and Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin: "Who Should Pay for Collective Security and How Much?"]

[Text] Tashkent— Outwardly, the first day of work of the CIS member states' military delegations ended productively with the adoption of the majority of the more than two dozen draft documents for inclusion in the package of defense questions for the Commonwealth heads of states. However, it is not hard to see that the drafts of those documents which talk of the need for specific financial investments have been rejected or deferred. First and foremost the "Agreement on the scale of and procedure for making fixed contributions to the

single defense budget for financing the CIS Joint Armed Forces," an agreement of very great importance for the future of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, has effectively been frozen for the time being.

Since entry to the conference hall for journalists was restricted, we can only judge the course and character of the discussions from the comments of actual participants in the meetings. Colonel General Pavel Kozlovskiy, Republic of Byelarus defense minister, and Aleksandr Kotenkov, leader of the Russian delegation, agreed to comment for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers on some of the results of the first day's work of the CIS Defense Ministers' Council.

Col. Gen. P. Kozlovskiy:

Why was the agreement on contributions to the single defense budget not initialed? Because, in our delegation's view, it did not fully define the structures which it is proposed to finance. This applies primarily to the strategic deterrent forces. After all, only Byelarus has signed the protocol which clearly defines what relates to the strategic forces and what is left to the republic. It is not completely clear how the other republics interpret this separation. Therefore, in our view, it is more accurate now to talk not of the single budget of the Joint Armed Forces but of the budget for the strategic forces and of the Main Command itself and its structures. We put the question this way: Let us make up our minds what belongs to whom today. Russia says that its costs in maintaining the Joint Armed Forces should be reimbursed. But here, too, it is necessary to calculate who owes what to whom. We believe, for example, that in the past five months we have invested quite a lot of money in the strategic troops stationed on Byelarus territory. In what form? They have used fuel, electricity, land, and the republic's communications systems. We do not mind paying our share but I repeat that all the figures must be calculated.

We also have our own position on the pension provision of servicemen of the former USSR Armed Forces. Why should the republic pay the pension of officers who served outside Byelarus? There are 90,000 pensioners in our country already today and around 40,000 Byelarusian officers are serving outside the republic. We are talking about substantial sums of money here. Perhaps it would be more correct if pensions were paid to officers entering the republic by the Commonwealth state where they finished their service. There are quite a few questions here, of course, and we shall not come to a final decision until after consultations with the republic's leadership.

A. Kotenkov:

It was clear from the outset that the main questions at the talks would not be theoretical ones. They have already been resolved in principle at previous meetings. The crucial task today is to develop a mechanism for implementing decisions that have been made. Primarily this means questions connected with financing the CIS

Joint Armed Forces. Problem number two, though in importance probably problem number one, is the social protection of servicemen and members of their families. The first question, I repeat, was resolved in theory long ago but as soon as it comes to the actual financing of actual programs, immediately there is deadlock. In fact, the lion's share of the finance of the army of 4 million men falls to Russia.

The question of the strategic forces was a surprise to us. It seemed that everything had been agreed long ago but in the republics they are suddenly starting to say that they do not intend maintaining the strategic forces, even those stationed on their territory. What is the solution? Politically Russia cannot take these units under its jurisdiction—that would be a violation of earlier agreements.

Unfortunately, Russia has also been left alone to resolve the problem of the destruction of chemical weapons. In the past all the republics had a hand in their production but now they are stockpiled on Russian territory alone. The destruction of chemical weapons is quite costly. But now they are telling us: You are storing them—you can destroy them. Is this really the way to go about things? The next question is: What about the nuclear weapons which have been sent to Russia, should they be destroyed entirely at our expense? [end of Kotenkov comment]

The 13 May morning session was opened by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, who arrived in Tashkent the day before. During the recess he answered journalists' questions on the main results of the military delegations' meeting:

"The positions of all the states on the two most important questions—the reduction of conventional arms in Europe and the financing of the Joint Armed Forces defense budget—have been clarified. But neither document has even been initialed. This is bound to cause alarm. I am compelled to tell the CIS Council of Heads of State that we must meet again with the foreign ministers before 25 May and reach a common decision based on our international commitments."

Further on Military Meeting

*PM1505104092 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 May 92 p 1*

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafyev and Captain 3d Rank V. Yermolin: "Tashkent: Military Delegations Failed To Resolve Main Tasks. Will the Politicians Succeed?"]

[Text] The work of the CIS member states' military delegations ended 14 May. Five documents were prepared for signing by the heads of state, and eight for the heads of government.

At the final session another attempt was made to reach agreement on initialing two key documents. Let us

remind you that the first one relates to the fulfillment of treaty commitments on reducing conventional arms in Europe, and the second to the financing of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. Unfortunately, as Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov did not conceal, neither document found its way into the package of defense matters for signing by the heads of state.

A statement was delivered at the session by Russian Federation First Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev. He voiced a protest in connection with the loss of an MI-26 military helicopter in the Transcaucasus.

"I have issued instructions," the general said, "that all bandit sorties against servicemen of the Russian Army and its military units are to be interdicted by fire, and the approaches to protected facilities are to be mined."

In the break we asked Army Gen. Pavel Grachev how the question of transferring to Russia's jurisdiction the military units stationed outside the Russian Federation is being tackled.

"We have taken under our jurisdiction," Grachev said, "those troops that are on the territory of states which have not announced the creation of their own armed forces or do not want the former Union Armed Forces. The status of the troops in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia will be defined by bilateral agreements. I believe that in the Transcaucasus Russian troops will have the status of a temporary presence with phased withdrawal over approximately two years. And in, say, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, group-of-forces status is a possibility, but agreement still has to be reached here. I wish to stress: In connection with the announcement of the Russian president's decree on the creation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, all these troops are not under Russia's jurisdiction, they are part of the Russian Armed Forces. And therefore the servicemen are henceforth under the social, moral, and military protection of the Russian Federation."

The military delegations finished work. Tomorrow the politicians will address the future fate of the CIS. It is known that only Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine will not be represented by their top people. On the initiative of Ukrainian premier Vitold Fokin, it is proposed to include on the agenda the question of the financial situation in the Commonwealth. The final signing of documents is planned for 16 May.

Khabarovsk Search for 23 'Missing' Warheads

LD2805201692 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1856 GMT 28 May 92

[From the "Incidents" section]

[Text] Khabarovsk—Representative of the Russian president for Khabarovsk territory is personally engaged with looking for 23 nuclear warheads which disappeared from military storehouses in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in

March this year. On May 27 Vladimir Desyatov, Russian president's representative for Khabarovsk krai, further told PF [POSTFACTUM]: Warheads with a power of 20 megatons were kept in Komsomolsk-on-Amur for some 15 years, although their owner or destination are unknown. Vladimir Desyatov refused to tell possible reasons of the disappearance of the ammunition, referring it was state secret. Some military experts believe that the lost warheads could belong to the ammunition of the nuclear submarines produced at the plant named after Lenin Komsomol in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. According to some data, it is forbidden to keep and supply submarines with nuclear ammunition. According to other information, the nuclear warheads can belong to medium-range ballistic missiles SS-20 (900-1100 km) of those stationed on the land in the Far Eastern Military District, which were to be destroyed according to the international agreement on cutting the medium-range missiles. In the opinion of some former officers of the Far Eastern Military District, ammunition of this kind should not be kept in such quantities in military units.

START TALKS

Strategic Missile Troops' Nuclear Safety Program

PM1905084592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 May 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel General G. Kolesnikov, deputy commander of Strategic Missile Troops, by correspondents Colonel A. Belousov and Major A. Dolinin; place and date not given: "Colonel General Gennadiy Kolesnikov: People Ensure Nuclear Safety. They Must Not Be Cut Back Before Weapons Are Cut Back"—first four paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] World news agencies (and our own too) have recently been keeping the pages of newspapers well supplied with sensational reports now about a leak of "nuclear brains" and "nuclear materials" from the CIS, now about sales abroad of warheads and even entire rockets. Although it turns out, in fact, that the majority of sensational cases are just rumors, nevertheless the world is alarmed: Are people in the CIS states in general and in Russia above all capable of ensuring the safety of their nuclear weapons?

Interest in this problem is growing all the time in connection with the upcoming meeting of CIS heads of state in Tashkent, where problems of the CIS Strategic Forces will be examined in addition to other questions, and with the start of the practical realization of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Offensive Arms. Our side has to eliminate approximately 900 delivery systems, neither more nor less. Each rocket means a nuclear charge plus tens of tonnes of no less dangerous fuel....

How does the main holder of nuclear weapons—the Strategic Missile Troops—ensure their safety?

Our correspondents talked about this with Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel General G. Kolesnikov, deputy commander of the Strategic Missile Troops.

"For greater clarity," Gennadiy Alekseyevich said, "let us single out the main areas for ensuring safety: first, in the course of the troops' fulfilling their everyday tasks; second, when taking rockets off alert status; third, when actually eliminating them. But I must remark in passing: The concept of 'rocket elimination' should not be taken literally. Rockets are destroyed in the sense that they cease to exist as weapons. Therefore we speak of salvaging them. Again, this does not mean that they will be written off as scrap. On the contrary, our aim is to secure the maximum saving by making secondary use of materials and by launching rockets into space for purposes compatible with the terms of the treaty."

"So, if we speak of safety not from the broad, political viewpoint but from a technical viewpoint, there are the fewest problems of all with rockets that are on alert status. Fueled and equipped with warheads, i.e. fully ready for combat use, they stand in silos. Their good condition, as well as the temperature, humidity, and all other parameters that influence safety, are monitored automatically from command posts. The unsanctioned launch of a rocket is ruled out—there is a reliable system of protection. Rocket complexes are also kept under guard."

"But things are different when a rocket is taken off alert status. The majority of the jobs here are highly dangerous operations. Above all, removal of the warhead. Like any action involving a nuclear charge, this is complex and delicate work. It happens like this...A special unit approaches the silo and is driven up to it, the gantry swings round, the warhead is detached from the rocket and begins to be lifted. Every centimeter of the distance it travels is monitored. It is monitored in all four [as published] planes. Not even the slightest deviation of the warhead is permitted, so as to avoid a blow, a chip in the protective cover, or a scratch. The most crucial operations are checked by highly trained professionals and the top men—directly by the unit commander, the chief engineer, and the combined unit commander. By them alone, not by persons deputizing for them. There is triple quality control over each operation. So reliability is ensured...."

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How long can a person work or stand alongside a warhead and not receive a dose in excess of the norm? Incidentally, what is the permissible dose for specialists?

[Kolesnikov] The nuclear charge on our rockets—I say this with full responsibility—is exceptionally protected against an escape of radioactive radiation from it. In the immediate vicinity of the warhead the background virtually corresponds to the natural background. Therefore specialists do not even need special means of protection. Of course, they have individual dose meters....

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What about the fuel, Gennadiy Alekseyevich? It is no coincidence, it has to be thought, that heptyl, which is used as the fuel, is called "blood poison." In addition, it is dangerously explosive and toxic. On contact with the air it forms chemical compounds that are still more toxic than the initial substance. To what extent is safety guaranteed here for people and the environment?

[Kolesnikov] Provision has been made for a whole system of protective measures. Specialists work only in special suits and gas masks. The closed hermetic cycle of operations to draw off the fuel prevents poisonous fumes from entering the atmosphere. Nevertheless, in case "untoward" situations should arise, there are specially trained emergency rescue groups which have at their disposal everything they need to neutralize fuel and oxidizer.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And yet it is known that, on combining with oxidizer, fuel ignites spontaneously, and an explosion is possible. Is it realistic to rule out the chance mixing of the components of fuel?

[Kolesnikov] The thing is that neither filling nor draining of fuel and oxidizer is ever carried out simultaneously, in parallel—only successively. One team—the fuel team—completes its work, turns around, and leaves along with all its equipment. After this the other team advances toward the silo, again with its own equipment designed only for oxidizer—pumping stations, mobile tanks, flexible metal hoses...Subsequently, in the course of transportation and then the transfer of the fuel components from road tankers to railroad ones, their paths will never cross. All this, I repeat, is done for the sake of one thing—to rule out a chance mixing of fuel components, which could result in an explosion.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that after draining the fuel nothing is left either in the tanks themselves or in the piping. At the same time heptyl is easily dissolved in water, and this solution could penetrate deep into the soil, thereby creating a long-term seat of contamination.

[Kolesnikov] Of course, it is impossible to drain it all off down to the last drop. Therefore, in order to remove vestiges of the fuel, the neutralization of equipment is carried out. Rockets undergo primary neutralization in our technical units, then at arsenals. There they have hot steam blown through them with the help of special installations, and the resultant harmful effluent is burned. There are special machines for these purposes too.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Let us not now forget about the third area which you mentioned....

[Kolesnikov] In the course of salvaging, warheads are sent in special containers with all possible precautions to the plants where they were manufactured. There the electronics and automatics are removed and salvaged. The nuclear charge itself, which is no longer a charge but

actually a fissile substance, can either be kept in special stores or used in nuclear reactors after appropriate processing. But these are the concerns of industrialists, not ours.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Pardon us, Gennadiy Alekseyevich, but we get the impression from our conversation with you that everything is so well organized among the troops that there are no problems over ensuring safety.

[Kolesnikov] More accurately, there could be no problems. Because we really know how to handle our weapons. This is not only to our credit but also that of the scientists, designers, specialists, and practical workers who have armed us with this ability. But something else causes concern now. Look what happens....

There is no denying the need to reduce strategic offensive arms—this is an urgent issue. Its realization will make it possible to ensure the defense of the CIS states, while observing parity with the United States at a lower and, accordingly, safer level of nuclear arms, and will provide an opportunity, in the final analysis, to economize on financial and human resources. But now that the volume of work on dismantling rocket complexes will increase, we must not start by cutting back people who have been trained for just this work. Moreover, nobody is relieving the technical rocket units of their responsibility for maintaining the remaining complexes in a combat-ready condition. Knowledgeable, experienced specialists must deal with the regulations, as well as the dismantling, and we have these people—why be in a hurry to say goodbye to them and then once again seek people to whom this very responsible work can be entrusted? In short, I believe that people must not be cut back before the weapons have been cut back. The tension among officers and ensigns must be removed, for many of them now think like this: They say we are needed while we are with the rockets, but where will we go when they remove the rockets? In actual fact, the social protection programs have not yet been fully worked out.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How is the present rather unstable political climate in the CIS affecting nuclear safety?

[Kolesnikov] The fruits of the share-out and nationalization of absolutely everything are palpable. Thus, in Ukraine there are plants producing systems for rocket complexes and arsenals which store the spare components needed to maintain the combat readiness of the Missile Troops. Now all this is being privatized, and difficulties are emerging over bringing out the necessary armament. Consequently, complexities arise over the elimination of faults which occur in rockets, launchers, and command posts—which can lead to a violation of the established nuclear safety system. But even those rockets that are in Ukraine or on the territory of any other of our four “nuclear republics” could become dangerous because of their aging and the impossibility of

replacing in proper time the assemblies and units which have gone out of commission.

It is important to emphasize once again that a necessary condition for universal safety is one-man leadership of the Strategic Missile Troops and the exclusion of any attempts to influence the system of battle management of the Missile Troops. For this there is just one path—the path of compromises, concord, and common sense.

Republics Sign START Protocol in Lisbon

LD2305191592 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT 23 May 92

[From the “Novosti” newscast]

[Text] The United States, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine signed a protocol in Lisbon today on fulfillment of the START treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons. This treaty was signed on 31 July 1991 by the presidents of the United States and the USSR. It envisages the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by one-third over a 7-year period.

‘Nonnuclear’ States Join

LD2405064892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0630 GMT 24 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Lisbon May 24 TASS—A protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed in the Portuguese capital on Saturday [23 May] by the foreign ministers of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.S. secretary of state.

This protocol is one of major international documents worked out recently, points out the Russian side's written statement read out at the signing ceremony.

The accord reached is of importance first of all because favourable conditions are being created for the entering into force of the START Treaty which is aimed at achieving strategic stability and which opens up the prospect for a further lowering of the level of strategic offensive arms and, consequently, for the strengthening of international security.

The written statement emphasises that Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union is a party to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and acts as a depositary of the treaty and consistently advocates the consolidation of the treaty and accession of all states to it.

“We particularly appreciate the protocol provision that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine should join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear states, of

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

course, which has been reflected in an appropriate clause of the protocol signed," said Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

Kozyrev Comments

LD2505000392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 2000 GMT 24 May 92

[Correspondent N. Gongadze report from Lisbon; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The agreement on a 50-percent cut in the nuclear arsenals of the former Union and the United States was signed a year ago. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of independent states on its territory has given the document a somewhat different nature.

Along with Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan have joined in resolving this extremely important international problem. A considerable strategic arsenal is still located on their territories; that is why the protocol in Lisbon already has been signed by the foreign ministers of five countries. It is thought that after seven years there will not be a single nuclear warhead or strategic means of delivering one on the territory of the Republics of Byelarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine.

[Begin Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev recording] I believe that this document provides the possibility of resolving two questions at once: First, to set in motion, after ratification, the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and second, to ensure the operation of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons on the territories of the former Soviet Union. The international community, the CIS, and each state individually gains from this because two international treaties will be consolidated and will start to operate with full effect on the territories of the former Soviet Union. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Comments

LD2605193492 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1430 GMT 26 May 92

[Text] A briefing for journalists accredited in Moscow took place at the Russian Foreign Ministry Press Center today. Correspondent Aleksey Sokolov reports.

[Sokolov] Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, highly appraised the results of the recent visit paid to Russia by Lech Walesa, president of the Republic of Poland, the documents that were signed and, in particular, the treaty on friendly and good-neighboringly cooperation. Yastrzhembskiy described the visit as a radical shift forward in the relations between Russia and Poland. The treaty between Russia and Kazakhstan, on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, was highly appraised.

[Begin Yastrzhembskiy recording] The treaty bears witness to the important significance of cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan for the preservation and consolidation of the Commonwealth. The treaty should demonstrate to all in what peaceful and amicable manner the questions of relations between independent states can be resolved, on the basis of civilized approaches. [end recording]

[Sokolov] The director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry also read out the Russian side's statement during the signing of the protocol to the START Treaty in Lisbon. This is what it says, in particular:

[Begin Yastrzhembskiy recording] The protocol makes it possible to take a serious step in the cause of the strengthening of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Russian side proceeds from the fact that the obligations enshrined in the messages from the highest leaders of the Byelarusian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the U.S. president, have been undertaken also with regard to all the other START Treaty signatory countries.

The Russian Federation also proceeds from this: that once a period of seven years, following the coming into force of the treaty on limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms, has expired, neither nuclear warheads for strategic arms, nor strategic vehicles for their delivery will be deployed on the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The Russian side sees the obligations of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine to join the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as soon as possible as participating states which have no nuclear weapons at their disposal as an integral and extraordinarily important part of the package.

The Russian side confirms that it sees the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as states that have no nuclear weapons at the time of the signing of the protocol and notes that their participation in the protocol confirms and strengthens their non-nuclear status. Signing the protocol, we noted with satisfaction that the provisions wholly and fully conform to the accords on nuclear weapons achieved within the CIS framework and, in particular, in the 30 December 1991 Minsk agreement on the strategic forces which provides for the procedure and timescales for the dismantling of this type of weapons, including those currently in Ukraine, by the end of 1994. [end recording]

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE**Mitterrand Visit, Troop Withdrawals Reviewed**

LD1505154592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 15 May 92

[Studio Interview with Foreign Minister Algirdas Saurdargas by announcer, on 15 May—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[Announcer] You have met and talked with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. Will the fact of what stand will be taken by Russia toward the withdrawal of the troops of the former USSR and of Russia deployed on the territory of Lithuania have importance in France's foreign policy toward Russia?

[Saudargas] Firstly, I would like to note that the withdrawal of the former Soviet army, for which now Russia is bearing responsibility, concerns us that it does not become an obstacle in our current good relations with Russia. Therefore concern about this exists. If the withdrawal is delayed, it may become an obstacle in the development of good relations between Lithuania and Russia, not mentioning the fact that it might worsen to some extent the relations between Russia and France. This is not included in our plans. Hence this concern, I think, bilateral concern both of the Republic of Lithuania and of Russia. This is noted at our talks. Of course, each country has its own interests, they are stated. Russia usually stresses that the issue of the withdrawal is linked with social aspects, with the officers' living conditions. Lithuania does not deny this but accentuates the problem of security, problems which might arise if the withdrawal of these troops is delayed for a long time. This is at least a normal dialogue that reflects the confrontation of interests. But without this confrontation no talks could take place, if there is no difference in interests, there is nothing to talk about. At present our attempts that this is discussed at international forums, I think, should not worsen relations between the Republic of Lithuania and Russia, moreover, between France and Russia.

[Announcer] Tell us, today at the briefing deputy Nikolay Nikolayevich Medvedev said that the inclusion of the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Lithuania already this year and the inclusion of this issue in the referendum might have a negative influence on the situation in Estonia and Latvia, and also that this issue might meet with a negative response of the international public in Europe. What can you say in this respect?

[Saudargas] I do not think so, I did not have that impression when I gave information about such initiatives of the Lithuanian public to include this issue in the nationwide referendum. We include this initiative of the Lithuanian society as an element of our foreign policy. We are using civilized methods, we intend to propose at the Helsinki conference a general mechanism that would solve or include such problems in the discussions at this conference. Such a referendum would create a precedent when it will be clearly stated that the society in one country does not wish it and demands that the army be withdrawn. If this is not done, if there are some delays, it will be a mechanism of internationalization, that it must be examined at international forums as a situation which threatens to become dangerous as far as some future conflicts are concerned, that it must be examined by

international society. I think that this is being received with understanding and I believe that the citizens of Lithuania will understand our stand and will respond to our initiative, will take part in the referendum and say "yes" for the withdrawal. I think that this will be a contribution not only to Lithuanian foreign policy, but also a positive contribution of Lithuania to the international mechanism of security.

Soviet Army Facilities Turned Over to Poland

*LD2005091392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1605 GMT 19 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Warsaw May 19 TASS—The population of the little Polish town of Sventoszow, Jelenegur Voivodship, took warm leave on Monday [18 May] with servicemen of the 20th division of the northern group of Russian troops and their families. A festive farewell ceremony was arranged for the artillery regiment of that division, formerly deployed at Rzeszow. Its barracks and other facilities were turned over to the Poles, the newspaper "POLSKA ZBROJNA" reported today.

The ceremony was attended by plenipotentiary representative of the Polish Government responsible for the affairs of former Soviet troops deployed on the territory of Poland Brigadier-General Zdzislaw Ostrowski and Commander of the Northern Group of troops Colonel-General Viktor Dubynin.

Secretary of the Polish Government's plenipotentiary representatives's commission, charged with the reception of property left behind by troops that are being withdrawn from Polish territory, Lieutenant-Colonel Weslaw Wajdzik told the newspaper that more than 550 various military installations will be handed over to Poland shortly.

According to General Dubynin, "Soviet troops, withdrawn from Poland, have already turned over to the Polish side 12 military garrisons, about 120 cantonments, and 2,000 other installations. As many as 875 of them were built on money received from the budget of the former Soviet Ministry of Defence and by Soviet military builders".

40,000 Troops To Leave Poland

*LD2305083692 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0700 GMT 23 May 92*

[Excerpts] Polish President Lech Walesa is completing his visit to Russia. [passage omitted] One of the agreements signed envisages the withdrawal of 40,000 former Soviet troops from Poland before 15 November. A smaller group of troops will stay for two years to coordinate the withdrawal of troops from Germany. Speaking at a press conference, Lech Walesa said relations between Russia and Poland are entering a new stage.

Progress of Baltic Withdrawal Talks

Russian Ambassador Comments

*LD2705214292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 27 May 92*

[Text] A 2-day meeting of the Lithuanian and Russian state delegations ended 27 May in Moscow. [Indistinct sentence omitted].

ELTA correspondent Balys Bucelis was told by the Lithuanian charge d'affaires in Russia, Egidijus Bickauskas, that the talks [words indistinct]. The Russian delegation attempted to embrace many issues at once, striving to push the main issue on the withdrawal of the army back as far as possible. The impression is created that [words indistinct] to understand that good-neighborly relations, prospects of economic cooperation, and other state affairs depend on this. They attempt with diplomatic [word indistinct] to suggest that the issue of the army is the same as, for instance, problems of ecology or customs.

However, our delegation proved that the issue of the army withdrawal was the most important, and talks on this topic began to be more concrete. However, the negotiations will be very difficult, stressed Egidijus Bickauskas.

The Russian ambassador for special assignments, Viktor Isakov, said: The army problem has been solved. It is leaving, it is leaving Germany, and is completing its withdrawal from Poland. It will leave Lithuania, too. We have proclaimed this obligation to Lithuania and to the world. Nobody should have any doubt about it. However, we cannot drive the officers' families into empty fields [words indistinct] We wish foreign countries to help us. I think that the Lithuanian Government will take our difficult economic situation into consideration.

Delegation Issues Statement

*LD2705213292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 27 May 92*

[Text] ELTA publishes today a statement by the Lithuanian state delegation:

The Lithuanian state delegation for negotiations with the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of the army regrets that the obligations by the Russian Federation contained in the communiques of the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation are not yet being fulfilled:

First, to withdraw from February 1992 the army from the Republic of Lithuania's territory, first of all, from its capital Vilnius; not to violate the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania; and for Russian army units, until their withdrawal, to strictly observe the laws of the Republic of Lithuania and the decisions of the Lithuanian Government.

All this constitutes a threat to democracy and stability, to the security of the Lithuanian people, to normal civilian and economic life, and hampers reform and foreign investment in Lithuania.

We are especially concerned that Russia, crudely violating international law, is still not withdrawing its army from the Lithuanian state border with third countries in spite of repeated requests by the Republic of Lithuania. We are concerned about the continuing damage inflicted by the Russian army to the Lithuanian environment, especially the destruction of forests and the failure to return illegally seized property.

We are suspicious that the negotiations, which do not yield results, are held to cover up the delay in army withdrawal. [Word indistinct] international political support is essential to the withdrawal of the former Soviet, and now Russian, army from the Republic of Lithuania and other Baltic countries.

The Lithuanian state delegation expresses its special concern about the threatening introduction of large new contingents of the Russian army to the territory of the Republic of Lithuania in the nearest future. We hope that Russia will show, in a concrete manner, its political good will.

Russians 'Displayed Goodwill'

*OW2805131892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1228 GMT 28 May 92*

[From "Diplomatic Panorama" by correspondents I. Porshnev and A. Pershin; transmitted via KYODO

[Text] *** At the talks with Lithuania concluded in Moscow on Wednesday [27 May] the Russian delegation displayed goodwill, Viktor Isakov chief Russian negotiator, told DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent. The Lithuanians, he explained, came to Moscow for the purpose of discussing "only one" issue: the withdrawal of Russian troops from their country. However it had been agreed to consider the entire range of relations between Russia and Lithuania, "including problems connected with property, fishery and cooperation between law-enforcing agencies".

Since the Lithuanian delegation included solely military experts, Russian delegates had an option: either suspend the talks or confine them to discussions on procedural questions and meetings of the working group on troops withdrawal. Finally they opted for the latter. The Russian delegation submitted several draft documents on concrete directions of bilateral cooperation as an official supplement to the protocol signed at the talks.

With reference to the problem of Russian troops withdrawal from Lithuania V. Isakov, said that this issue is under consideration. The head of the Russian delegation has an impression that "the Lithuanians are in no haste to resolve this issue either". "They are obviously awaiting June 14, when a referendum on the need to withdraw

Russian troops as early as this year and pay a compensation for the damage done by the former Soviet Army is held in Lithuania", he said.

According to V. Isakov, Lithuania doesn't always strive to understand the difficulties connected with the withdrawal of Russian troops. "Russian troops have no intention of remaining in Lithuania. Nevertheless we cannot really be expected to remove them to a field and leave them to dwell in tents", the diplomat said.

He believes that the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania and other Baltic states should be considered in the "context of the general situation when tens of thousands of servicemen are returning to Russia from Germany, Hungary, Poland and other countries". "Unfortunately, our Lithuanian colleagues do not want to understand this", V. Isakov stressed.

With reference to Lithuania's demand that a compensation be paid for the damage caused by the presence of the former Soviet Army (according to the leader of the Lithuanian delegation Aleksandras Abishala it amounts to 150 billion dollars), V. Isakov pointed out that Lithuania "retained all the former USSR property: ports, railways and plants".

According to V. Isakov, the demand that a compensation be paid for the damage caused by the presence of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil will be justified only if Lithuania itself agrees to pay a compensation to Russia for part of the former USSR property.

Russian-Latvian-Lithuanian Withdrawal Talks

*LD2605102992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0940 GMT 26 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow, 26 May—The latest round of talks between the state delegations of Russia and Latvia began today in the settlement of Meshcherino, close to Moscow. The delegations are headed by, respectively, Sergey Zotov, the Russian Federation special envoy, and Yanis Dinevics, state minister of the Latvian Republic.

At the same time, the first meeting between state delegations of Russia and Lithuania, led by Ambassador Viktor Isakov and Aleksandras Abisala, minister without portfolio of the Lithuanian Republic, began in Moscow.

One of the main topics at both meetings is the withdrawal of former USSR troops which are under Russian jurisdiction from the Baltic states. As reported to the ITAR-TASS correspondent by Sergey Zotov, the Russian side is tabling a proposal at the current meeting on the schedule for the stage-by-stage withdrawal of troops, and "is prepared to consider all constructive proposals capable of creating the material prerequisites to reduce the timeframe of the withdrawal."

According to Viktor Isakov, the issue of presenting a schedule for the withdrawal of the former USSR troops from Lithuania will be resolved in the near future.

As is known, Lithuania is insisting on the withdrawal of troops by the end of this year, Latvia by the fall of 1993. The Russian representatives do not consider these to be realistic timeframes.

Ambassador on Latvian Talks

*LD2505154892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0730 GMT 25 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow, 25 May—At the talks between Russian and Latvian delegations, to be held in Moscow from 26 to 28 May, the Russian side will propose the creation of a "constant and regular negotiating machinery between the two countries, capable of quickly establishing a legal basis, in treaty form, for bilateral relations." This was disclosed by roving ambassador Sergey Zotov, head of the Russian delegation at the talks with the Latvian Republic, in an interview he gave to an ITAR-TASS correspondent today.

He said that proceeding from the objective of establishing truly friendly and cooperative relations with Latvia, which has been set by the country's leadership, the Russian delegation will aim to ensure that Russian-Latvian relations fully agree with the Helsinki process and all-European efforts to build a secure and democratic Europe and to form a common legal, economic, and cultural space on the European continent. Sergey Zotov said the Russian delegation will continue to pay special heed to guarantees for the legal and social protection of the Russian-speaking population, protection of the rights and interests of Russian Federation citizens living in Latvia, development of mutually beneficial economic cooperation, settlement of property rights, and the planned withdrawal of troops with a realistic time-table, without harming the security of either side or jeopardizing the interests of strategic stability and the consolidation of an atmosphere of trust in mutual relations.

Sergey Zotov particularly stressed that work to complete the drafting of an agreement on a stage-by-stage withdrawal of forces and their legal status during the withdrawal could only proceed normally if Latvian authorities guarantee that the escalation of provocative actions will be halted. The blood of a Russian soldier has already been shed as a result of these provocations, the head of the Russian delegation recalled.

The Russian ambassador reiterated that Russian forces in the Baltic republics pose no threat whatsoever to the independence of states in the region. They are not interfering in their internal affairs and will not do so. Russia does not intend to manipulate the troop withdrawal problem, to turn it into a means of pressuring the

Balts, he said. We will not, however, accept any attempt to resolve the question of the troop withdrawal in an uncivilized way, Sergey Zотов stressed.

Participants Noted

*LD2705084992 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 0430 GMT 27 May 92*

[Text] Regular talks on the withdrawal of the former Russian Army from Latvia are beginning. A regular round of talks on the withdrawal of the Army from the territory of Latvia began in Moscow today [26 May]. Participating in the talks on the Latvian side are: Janis Dinevics, the head of the delegation and minister of state; Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis; and Dainis Turlajs, commander of the defense forces.

The Latvian side has submitted a draft agreement on the schedules and dates for the Army withdrawal. The agreement first concerns the units to be withdrawn from the garrisons, that is, freeing the towns of Latvia from the Army, and also the matter of taking over property, which of late has become especially exacerbated.

The Latvian side has expressed a demand for setting the final date for withdrawal as September 1993, and October of this year as the date for the withdrawal of the troops from the capital, Riga. Experts express doubts that Russia will be willing to accept these dates.

Russia Submits Withdrawal Schedule

*LD2705103792 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 2000 GMT 26 May 92*

[Excerpts] On 26 May in Moscow, talks between the official delegations of Latvia and Russia began. Peteris Austrums will review their course specially for our information:

[Austrums] A delegation of the Latvian Government arrived in Moscow with Janis Dinevics at its head, in order to continue, or in fact, to start talks with the Russian Federation on an extensive range of questions, in particular on the problems of the Army withdrawal. [passage omitted]

The Russian side submitted the schedule, demanded by Latvia a long time ago, according to which, from the standpoint of the Russian side, it would be possible to withdraw the troops.

The schedule looks as follows:

Some 30 percent of the troops may be withdrawn in the first year, that is in 1992. Then, around the same amount in 1993-94, and the remainder, in fact almost half of the troops which are stationed in the Baltics, the Russians envisage to withdraw in the period until 1999.

Such a schedule is of course absolutely unacceptable to Latvia, and this was also reported. Tomorrow, however, work will evidently continue in the groups of experts of

various branches in order to attempt to somehow bring the positions of both sides closer.

Overall it may be said that the talks proceeded in a businesslike, but not at all friendly or very constructive atmosphere. One of the Russian side's very serious warnings was that Russia would discontinue any talks on the Army withdrawal if an escalation of provocations against the Russian soldiers continues in Latvia. Here Russia means the occurrences with the customs, the land defense force men, and the shot big toe on the environs of Riga [incident in which Russian soldier received gunshot wounds to the foot while trying to steal cabling equipment]. Here at the highest level it has been decided that if this behavior continues the talks would be discontinued.

At the moment our delegation is preparing for tomorrow's round of talks in various groups and on various subjects—on economic, military, and socio-humanitarian questions. It is anticipated that the talks will continue until Wednesday afternoon [27 May], when a news conference will be held at the Latvian Embassy, and we will be able to more or less accurately learn about the results of the talks. [passage omitted]

First Group of 14th Army Troops Leave Moldova 26 May

*LD2705110892 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 27 May 92*

[Gennadiy Varfolomeyev report from Tiraspol]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The first group of servicemen of the 14th Army Assault Regiment, besieged by inhabitants of Chisinau, left Moldova on 26 May. The situation in the combat zone has remained relatively calm for more than three days, despite isolated shooting incidents.

Byelarus Armed Forces Reduced According to Agreements

*OW2905105492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1023 GMT 29 May 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] After completion of its three-day visit to Byelarus, a British group of assessment and information on the armed forces confirmed the correctness of the republic's data on the reduction of the armed forces and armaments. They stated that the process is going on in compliance with the international agreements. A group of the British experts visited Byelarus in the framework of the Vienna Agreement on the confidence building measures and cooperation in Europe.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Information Declassified

PM2205131592 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
20 May 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by Oleg Stefashin: "Information on Semipalatinsk Test Range Declassified"]

[Text] The Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers has declassified all materials containing information about the results of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk range.

So far they have been kept in "secret" departments and only a very restricted range of people could use them. Now access to secret information is available to almost anyone interested in it.

It is quite obvious that this openness will finally make it possible not only to lift the last shrouds of secrecy surrounding the test range but will also be of serious assistance to physicians and scientists who are undertaking research in the zone of the radiological calamity.

The cabinet of ministers has made one more important decision—to prepare a comprehensive program for the study of the area adjacent to the nuclear test range and also of the people living there. It has already been stated that this entire enormous territory, including Semipalatinsk Oblast and a number of rayons of Karaganda, Pavlodar, and East Kazakhstan oblasts, will be declared an ecological disaster zone and its population will receive the status of victims.

It is expected that the government will also take a number of other measures.

'25 Other Sites' Affected

LD2305215292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 23 May 92

[Text] Apart from the Semipalatinsk testing ground, nuclear explosions were carried out at 25 other sites in Kazakhstan. Sergey Medvedev, republican minister of ecology and biological resources, has said. He also said that top secret information on the actual state of radiation pollution is to be made public in Semipalatinsk, the NEGA agency reported.

Kazakh Legislators Oppose U.S. Stance on Tests

LD2605175492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1740 GMT 26 May 92

[By KAZTAG correspondent Konstantin Borodinov for TASS]

[Text] Alma-Ata May 26 TASS—A campaign to collect signatures under an appeal to the U.S. senators went under way at a session of Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet opened here today. The appeal expresses disagreement

with U.S. Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney's statement opposing the termination or curbing of nuclear tests by the United States.

Together with activists of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk public anti-nuclear movement, deputies propose to enter the third millennium without nuclear weapons. To this end, it is necessary that tests be terminated or curbed already today. At one time, Kazakhstan's public scored a convincing victory over the military-industrial complex, as result of which the nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk has been silent for the third year.

"However, American military men are skirting a similar move," says Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement Chairman Olzhas Suleymanov. "How can Richard Cheney's statement that the Soviet test programme was suspended only for ecological reasons be evaluated otherwise?" According to Cheney, the U.S. programme is being implemented very responsibly in terms of ecology.

"Military men in our country also used to state previously that nuclear tests do not harm the environment. I would say with pride that we managed to prove the opposite. We now arrive freely at the Semipalatinsk test range and have access to many documents. We are pressing for the U.S. side, too, to allow us to visit the Nevada range. Our activists were taken somewhere around it but they did not get to its territory," Suleymanov said.

Russian Ministry Chief on China's Nuclear Test, Moratorium

PM2705085692 Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA* in Russian 27 May 92 p 1

[Interview with Valeriy Bogdan, chief of the secretariat of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy, by A. Khokhlov; place and date not given: "While the 'Greens' Look for a Bald Deer, Silos for Nuclear Charges Are Being Prepared in Novaya Zemlya"—first two paragraphs are *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA* introduction]

[Text] China carried out its latest underground nuclear explosion on 21 May at the Lobnor nuclear testing range in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (not far from the Russian border). Swedish seismologists assessed its yield at one megatonne. Russian experts are talking about two megatonnes. In any case, it was one of the most powerful nuclear explosions in the world in recent years. And while the two nuclear superpowers, Russia and the United States, are vying with one another in peaceability, a third nuclear giant is emerging in the world.

Valeriy Bogdan, chief of the secretariat of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy, answers *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*'s questions.

[Khokhlov] Have there been explosions of a similar yield in our country?

[Bogdan] Yes, and even bigger. But that was a long time ago. Under the bilateral Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests we started exploding charges of a yield of not more than 150 kilotonnes. China has not concluded any similar treaties.

[Khokhlov] The echo of the underground explosion even reached Sweden. Presumably China was testing a new generation of weapon?

[Bogdan] Third-generation nuclear weapons are low-yield weapons. They are distinguished by high accuracy of delivery to the target and, let us say, certain peculiarities in the destruction of targets and enemy manpower. The Lobnor test indicates that China does not yet have such weapons. But that country's scientists are continuing to develop the national nuclear program.

[Khokhlov] Our nuclear testing ranges have been silent for two years now. Will they "speak" again?

[Bogdan] That is a decision for the Russian Supreme Soviet. The position of the military nuclear experts is clear: You cannot move forward in the development of science and weapons expertise without conducting live tests, without real explosions. The Russian president is acquainted with that view. Yeltsin has promised us support and help.

[Khokhlov] Is it necessary to improve nuclear weapons? Russia already has enough, most likely, to destroy the entire globe.

[Bogdan] No other nuclear power has proposed as many peace initiatives and moratoriums as the USSR, and now Russia. And today the only ones maintaining a "peaceful" silence are ourselves and France, which has also declared a moratorium on tests until the end of 1992. The other states belonging to the "nuclear club" are testing and carrying out explosions. China, for instance. A number of other countries will also become nuclear powers soon. Without the development of military science, without live tests, Russia will not be able to guarantee its own security in 10 years or so.

[Khokhlov] How many nuclear testing ranges does Russia currently have?

[Bogdan] The USSR had two. You can forget Semipalatinsk today: Kazakhstan's position is clearly defined—there are to be no tests. Only the Novaya Zemlya range, the northern range, remains.

[Khokhlov] But the ecological situation in the north of Russia is bad enough already, even without any more nuclear explosions.

[Bogdan] It is no worse there, though unfortunately it is no better either, than in many other regions of Russia. The nuclear contribution to pollution is far smaller than

what is "depicted" by those who are today, in my view, whipping up passions over the Novaya Zemlya range.

A highly qualified team led by Professor Ramzayev from the St. Petersburg Institute of Radiation Hygiene has been carrying out a study in the north for 30 years. The radiation factor is by no means in first place on the list of factors having a harmful effect on ecology and on people's health. None of the ecology movement's activists has yet had any success in the search for a bald deer or a fish without scales. No such thing exists, although there are plenty of stories about such anomalous phenomena. It is reminiscent of the episode of the "sensational" photograph of the six-legged foal or calf—the "Chernobyl mutant." Until it turned out that this poor freak was photographed several years before the Chernobyl tragedy, in Yugoslavia.

[Khokhlov] When does the unilateral Russian moratorium on underground nuclear tests expire?

[Bogdan] On 26 October 1992. Nuclear scientists are hoping that the Russian Supreme Soviet and the president will have made a final decision by that time. For the moment, ordinary, standard mining operations are continuing at the Novaya Zemlya range, silos are being prepared for the charges. Whether or not permission is granted for an explosion, we are preparing. But the hope remains that Russia will be able to reach agreement with the United States on the total cessation of nuclear tests. That would be the first step toward a nuclear-free world.

'Regret' Expressed Over Test

*LD2205215392 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2019 GMT 22 May 92*

[Text] Moscow, 22 May (ITAR-TASS)—It now is known that at 0900 Moscow time on 21 May, China carried out an underground nuclear explosion at the Lop Nor test-range (approximately 1,000 km from the CIS border). Russian experts estimate that the explosion had a yield of between 1 and 2 megatonnes.

"The Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry expresses regret at the fact that in conditions of a continuing moratorium on nuclear tests by Russia and France, and also some amount of restraint in nuclear weapons testing being shown by other nuclear states, China has embarked on this step, which could seriously complicate the process of improving the international situation and curtailing the arms race," says a statement issued here by Russia's Foreign Ministry. "A noticeable feature is that the yield of the explosion carried out greatly exceeded the threshold which has been adhered to by other nuclear states for many years. It is well known that Russia and the United States are complying with the treaty concluded in 1974 on not exceeding nuclear explosion yields of 150 kilotonnes."

"In advocating the soonest possible halting of all nuclear weapon tests, the Russian side expresses the hope that its efforts in this area will be supported by all nuclear

powers, including, of course, China. As a specific step on the way to this goal, we call on China to join the moratorium on nuclear tests, which is at present being adhered to by Russia and France."

Kazakh Commentary

*924P0141A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Apr 92 p 4*

[Article by I. Chasnikov, corresponding member of the AN RK [Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan]: "The Secrecy of the Lop Nor Test Range, Which Is Hard to Compare With the Secrecy of the Semipalatinsk Test Range"]

[Text] Before the opening of the International Conference on Problems Related to the Chinese Nuclear Test Range at Lop Nor, I was asked by journalists:

"Don't you think that holding a conference on problems related to the Lop Nor Test Range is interference in China's internal affairs?"

I responded:

"Can we remain silent if the products of nuclear explosions at the range, which is located close to the border with Kazakhstan, fall in our region and affect the health and life of the people more than explosions at the Semipalatinsk Range? According to information from the Kazakhstan Scientific Research Institute of Oncology and Radiology, the incidence of tumors among children in Alma-Ata Oblast (not including the city of Alma-Ata) increased by 30 percent over the period from 1970 to 1989, and their death rate—the highest in Kazakhstan—tripled from 1979 to 1989. Passing over this in silence is a crime, and a reproach against those who have started a nuclear [arms] race. Consideration of questions such as this at the conference is not interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring state, it is a humane act of struggle for the health and life of mankind."

The first Chinese atomic bomb was exploded on 16 October 1964, that is, after conclusion of the agreement banning nuclear testing in the three media in 1963. As we know, France and China did not sign this agreement. The yield of the first explosion was no more than 20 kilotons, that is, comparable with the yield of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Traces of radioactive contamination were recorded in Kazakhstan, in the Far East, and other areas.

The first thermonuclear explosion was conducted on 17 June 1967. Its yield was about 3 megatons (1 megaton equals 1,000 kilotons). The thermonuclear explosions of 27 June 1973 and 17 June 1974 resulted in substantial radioactive contamination in 1974 and 1975 (certain radioactive nuclei increased by a factor of 100 or more).

The thermonuclear explosion in the atmosphere on 17 November 1976 had the largest yield (about 4 megatons).

The last explosion in the atmosphere was conducted on 16 October 1980. So nuclear bombs have been exploded in the atmosphere at the Lop Nor Test Range for exactly 16 years, but only for 13 years at the Semipalatinsk Range.

The explosions conducted on the ground and at low altitude or underground, which eject soil intermixed with radioactive nuclei, produce critical contamination of the areas close to the test ranges. The explosions at high altitude can cast radioactive substances into the stratosphere; first they form a cloud, then they are dispersed depending on weather conditions and fall in various parts of the earth for many years, contaminating it entirely. The radioactive clouds from nuclear explosions at Semipalatinsk or the Lop Nor Test Range have been reaching the Far East several days later and America after 7 to 10 days, and after going around the earth, they have returned to where they originated (the radioactive clouds "live" for about a month).

The reports by my colleagues—Professor A.K. Zhetbayev, director of the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences; Professor Ye.V. Kolomeyets, chairman of the Department of Cosmic Radiation Physics of the Kazakh State University imeni Al-Farabi; and L.D. Ptitskaya, head of the Laboratory for Radiation Monitoring of the Environment of the Kazgidromet [presumably: Kazakhstan Hydrometerological Service]—have characterized the radioactive contamination over Alma-Ata and the oblast, as well as in the surface layer, caused by the nuclear explosions at the Lop Nor Test Range.

By using the data which has been published, principally in the foreign press, we can establish the distribution for a number of the nuclear explosions we know of at the Semipalatinsk and Lop Nor test ranges from 1949 to 1990. I want to draw attention to the following circumstance: according to our data, just one bomb with a yield of about 1 megaton was tested in the atmosphere at the Semipalatinsk Test Range at the time that two 1-megaton bombs, five 3-megaton bombs, and one 4-megaton bomb were exploded at the Lop Nor Test Range. Thus, nuclear weapons of mass destruction have been tested at the Lop Nor Test Range for a longer period and the yield of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere has been higher than at the test range near Semipalatinsk, where the total number of nuclear explosions has been substantially higher.

I noted in my previous articles that there is a correlation between infant mortality and nuclear explosions. The data on child mortality, or more precisely, infant mortality, were taken from published references and verified at the NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Pediatrics of the Kazakhstan Ministry of Health. In our view, there is no question that for every 1,000 births, the substantial increase in the mortality of infants under 1 year old, beginning in 1971 and peaking in the 1976-1981 period in Semipalatinsk and other oblasts, was linked with manifestations of radiation in the second generation of

individuals. The grandchildren are suffering more than their parents, who were born chiefly in the initial period of nuclear testing, when explosions were conducted on the ground or at low altitude, with severe contamination of the regions adjacent to the test range. According to the data provided by V.G. Ushakova and others (the report was presented at the conference), it was shown that the high percentage of stillbirths in the 1976-1980 period in Gorno-Altay [Autonomous Oblast] were from parents born in the initial period of nuclear weapons testing at the Semipalatinsk Test Range.

(After 1957, the testing of nuclear weapons with the highest yield, up to 56 megatons, was conducted on Novaya Zemlya.)


Some decrease in infant mortality in Semipalatinsk Oblast was observed in 1979, which may be explained by the moratorium on weapons testing in 1959 and 1960. The peak in infant mortality in Alma-Ata Oblast (not including the city) observed in 1975 was substantially

higher than the infant mortality in Semipalatinsk Oblast in the same year. The testing of nuclear weapons with a yield of more than 1 megaton in 1973 and 1974 led to considerable contamination of the environment in Kazakhstan, including Alma-Ata Oblast, which may have had an effect on the increase in infant mortality in this region in 1975.

For the city of Alma-Ata infant mortality increases as a rule in the year following the highest-yield explosions at the Lop Nor Test Range (the result was similar in Semipalatinsk Oblast). Thus, after the last nuclear explosion in the atmosphere in October 1980, infant mortality in the city of Alma-Ata in 1981 and 1982 increased by roughly 40 percent, compared with 1979 and 1980. The effect of the increase in infant mortality was not present in the 1971-1976 period in countries located far from the test ranges in Kazakhstan and China.

Thanks to the national "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement and the support of the republic's government and


Figure 1



Key:

- (1) Number of nuclear explosions
- (2) Explosions in the atmosphere
- (3) Underground explosions
- (4) Semipalatinsk Test Range
- (5) Lop Nor Test Range
- (6) 3 megatons each
- (7) 1 megaton
- (8) 4 megatons

Figure 2



Key:

- (1) Infant mortality per 1,000 births
- (2) Semipalatinsk Oblast
- (3) City of Alma-Ata
- (4) Alma-Ata Oblast

president, the Semipalatinsk Test Range has been shut down and we have managed to obtain some information about it. Unfortunately, the ecological disaster zone has not been defined officially by the government thus far. The public knows practically nothing about the suffering of the people living near the Lop Nor Test Range. I hope that all five of the planet's nuclear test ranges will be shut down in the coming years and that the "Rebirth of the Earth and Mankind" program will be realized.

The organizing committee of the International Conference on Problems Related to the Chinese Nuclear Test Range plans to publish the reports and speeches in a separate collection, where readers can obtain more detailed information on the Lop Nor Test Range.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Investigation Notes 'Unofficial' Versions of Anthrax Leaks Noted

924P0138A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Does a Cow Amount to a Bacteriological Bomb?"]

[Text] Official Versions

Version No. 1. Spring 1979. The first patients with anthrax were hospitalized in Sverdlovsk. A commission of the Ministry of Health concluded that the infection spread to people from a sick cow.

Version No. 2. Fall 1989. Students drafted to help collective farmers in the fields around Krasnoufimsk in Sverdlovsk Oblast fell ill with an unknown disease. The tragedy recurred two years later. The cause has not been determined to this day.

Unofficial Versions

As early as 1979, rumors spread in Sverdlovsk that the "thrax" leaked from military settlement No. 19.

Circumstantial Evidence

On 4 April 1992, the president of Russia signed the Law on Upgrading Survivor Benefits for the Families of Citizens Who Died of Anthrax in the City of Sverdlovsk in 1979. Almost at the same time, our country finally admitted that it had violated the 1972 convention banning bacteriological weapons.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

JPRS-TAC-92-019
16 June 1992

The final stage of the investigation is beginning. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA investigative team is flying to Yekaterinburg.

Our telephone number in Moscow is 257-27-65.

CIS Agreement on Chemical Weapons Issued

*PM2205151392 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 May 92 First Edition p 2*

[“Agreement Among the CIS States on Chemical Weapons,” adopted at 15 May session of Council of CIS heads of state in Tashkent]

[Text] The states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, henceforth known as the “Commonwealth states,”

acknowledging that chemical weapons were created as part of the unified strategic potential of the former USSR in the security interests of the republics comprising it,

noting that all the facilities for storing and producing chemical weapons are on the territory of the Russian Federation,

confirming the commitments on joint participation in preparing and implementing international treaties on questions of arms cuts,

being filled with the determination to continue to act to ensure the speediest prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Commonwealth states confirm the former USSR's commitments under the 17 June 1925 Geneva Protocol.

In so doing:

the Russian Federation will take it upon itself to implement the commitments arising out of this protocol, while confirming the reservations about the possible retaliatory use of chemical weapons made on 5 April 1928 when the ratification document was deposited,

the remaining Commonwealth states, which have no chemical weapons storage or production facilities on their territory, will consider the possibility of subscribing to the Geneva Protocol without any reservations about the right to retaliatory use of chemical weapons.

Article 2

The Commonwealth states will conduct a coordinated policy in order to conclude as soon as possible a properly verifiable multilateral Convention on Chemical Weapons prohibiting at the global level the development, production, and use of chemical weapons and ensuring the elimination of all stocks.

Article 3

The Commonwealth states will stand by the decision announced by the former USSR in 1987 on halting the production of chemical weapons.

Article 4

The Russian Federation will commit itself to destroying chemical weapons with consideration for its real capabilities and in accordance with international agreements.

The Commonwealth states will cooperate in the destruction of chemical weapons. Questions of the Commonwealth states' involvement in the specific funding of measures to destroy stocks of chemical weapons are regulated by a separate agreement.

Article 5

The Commonwealth states will conduct a coordinated policy to monitor [po kontrolyu za] the export of “dual-purpose” chemicals, which are produced by industry for peaceful purposes but could be used to produce chemical weapons, and also of the technologies for their manufacture.

Article 6

The Commonwealth states will consult with one another on all matters related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Article 7

This agreement enters into force the moment it is signed.

Done in Tashkent on 15 May 1992 in one authentic copy in Russian. The authentic copy will be kept in the archives of the Republic of Belarus Government, which will send a certified copy of it to the states that have signed this treaty.

The document has been signed by the representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Armenia Accused of Using ‘Toxic Chemical Agents’

*LD2605190792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1737 GMT 26 May 92*

[By AZERINFORM correspondent Sabir Mirzoyev for TASS]

[Text] Baku May 26 TASS—Three people were killed and eight wounded over the last [words indistinct] a result of shelling of the Azerbaijani villages of Todan and Shefek by Armenian guerrillas.

The Azerbaijani Defence Ministry said shells which destroyed several houses in the town of Fizuli on Tuesday [26 May] were charged with toxic agents.

Further on Chemical Weapons Use

LD2205200792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 22 May 92

[Report by M. Mamedov from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Armenian armed formations continued to shell villages in the Sharuskaya and Sadarak rayons of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic today. Nevertheless, despite this, soldiers of the national army and local self-defense units succeeded in taking the commanding heights from the adversary and in bringing about a turning point in the continuing military actions. There are, however, depressing reports also: today, apart from conventional rockets and shells, chemical weapons were once again used by Armenia. This naturally gave rise to serious concern on the part of the leadership of the autonomous republic and of medical workers. The seriously injured were sent on a special flight to Turkey today.

Local observers note the concentration of CIS troops on the other side of the border. It should be said the position of Russia in this conflict is causing perplexity, to put it mildly, in Azerbaijan. While representatives of the CSCE, the United States, France, Iran, and Turkey have described the actions of the neighboring republic as overt aggression, Russian officials declare their support for Armenia and its expansionist plans. What assessment then, in this case, is made of the Karskiy treaty on the status of Nakhichevan which was concluded in 1921 by Russia and Turkey, under which these states are the guarantors of the territorial integrity of that region?

At a session of the Milli Majlis, sharp criticism was also levelled at Russian television, which is spreading misinformation about Kurds in Azerbaijan. This is seen as a provocation and as another ideological and political attack on the republic's territorial integrity.

Aliyev on Chemical Weapons

LD2405220892 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 24 May 92

[Text] Correspondent Azer Khalilov in Baku reports that, according to information from the press center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 May was not a quiet day either in rayons of the Nakhichevan Republic bordering Armenia or in Karabakh.

[Khalilov] As is known, about a week ago Armenian troops crossed the state border of Azerbaijan and entered the territory of Sadarakskiy rayon of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. Geydar Aliyev, chairman of the Supreme Majlis, said in a telephone conversation with me late in the evening on 23 May that Armenian troops had used chemical weapons against the civilian population of neighboring Sharurskiy rayon, which also borders Armenia. According to a report from the press center of the Ministry of Defense, during the three days of fighting

in Sadarakskiy and Sharurskiy rayons of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, the number of dead rose to more than 20 and the number of wounded totaled 100. The situation also is extremely difficult in Zangelanskiy, Kubatlinskiy, Kazakhskiy, Lachinskiy, and Fizulinskiy rayons of Azerbaijan, which also border Armenia.

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan has reported that on the morning of 24 May Kurdish villages in Lachinskiy rayon still were being shelled from missile and artillery installations from both Shushinskiy rayon, which is occupied by Armenian troops, and Gorisskiy rayon in Armenia. The Ministry of Defense reports that Kurdish guerrilla units have made daring attacks on the positions of Armenian armed formations deployed near the rayon center, the town of Lachin.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Russia-PRC Border Troop Reduction Talks Conclude

OW1905114292 Moscow Radio Moscow
in Mandarin 0400 GMT 19 May 92

[From the "Asian Affairs" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, reducing Russian and Chinese Armed Forces deployed along the common border to a minimum has become an important basis on which the two countries might continue to improve their good-neighborly relations. This view was put forward for discussion by participants at a seminar on prospects for the development of Sino-Russian relations held in Moscow over the last few days. What, then, has become of the talks, started with the Chinese in 1988, on reducing troops and building confidence in border areas? Station reporter Solovyev interviewed (Shileyev), a participant in this seminar and leader of the Russian delegation to the talks with China.

(Shileyev) said: We might say with good reason that, on the whole, the results of several rounds of talks between diplomats and soldiers have not been bad. We have already reached a consensus on most contents of the final agreement. As far as complexities of the talks go, I must admit they are indeed many. A number of issues, such as identifying the armed forces and weapons that need to be reduced, as well as the specific extent of reductions and so forth, are very difficult for the two sides and may take up a lot of time. Furthermore, there is a big difference between the two sides in military structures in border areas.

(Shileyev) continued: I would particularly like to point out that a great deal of mutual trust permeated our talks. Mutual contacts between the militaries of our two countries have also served to promote a good atmosphere. I refer to contacts that have nothing to do with the talks. Would it have been possible a few years ago for us to invite Chinese soldiers to come see some Russian

national defense information never shown to outsiders? Such contacts are now commonplace. Naturally, the Chinese side reciprocated. [Words indistinct] how important an atmosphere of partnership can be during the present talks?

(Shileyev) continued: Although mutual reduction of armed forces deployed along the common border areas is an international issue, as far as we are concerned it is also an internal issue. It has direct bearing on Russian social security, as well as that of people in border areas. [Words indistinct] large-scale measures need to be taken [words indistinct]. In addition, troop withdrawals from the Far East and other parts of Russia will promote local economic development. It also presents a special problem that we need to solve. I am very pleased that the Chinese understand this issue thoroughly.

Finally, (Shileyev) pointed out: We have also reached mutual understanding on some other issues. I think this is the main guarantee for completely eliminating the obstacle of Russian-Chinese borders disputes left us by recent history.

Thus, (Shileyev), a participant in the seminar on prospects for Sino-Russian relations held in Moscow and leader of the Russian delegation to the talks with China on reduction of armed forces and confidence-building in Sino-Russian border areas, concluded his remarks.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukraine-Turkey Support Nuclear-Free Black Sea

92UM1052B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
7 May 92 p 1

[Article: "A Nuclear-Free Black Sea?"]

[Text] UKRINFORM—The Ukraine and Turkey have expressed support for removing nuclear weapons from the Black Sea basin, announced Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk at a press conference at the Ankara Airport prior to his departure from Turkey. "A nuclear-free Black Sea can become an example not only for the region but also for the entire world," he said.

The problem of returning Crimean Tatars to their homeland, the head of the Ukrainian state noted, is not just a regional problem, and it must be solved at the interstate level. The Turkish side, he emphasized, gave a positive assessment to our steps in the direction of repatriation of Crimean Tatars.

Leonid Kravchuk reported that a great deal of attention was devoted in the Ukrainian-Turkish talks in Ankara to the situation in Nagornny Karabakh and in the Caucasus. He pointed out in this case that the Ukraine and Turkey are doing everything possible to ensure stability in this region. The sides also exchanged opinions

regarding the future of the CIS. The Ukrainian president noted that unanimity was reached in all issues that were discussed.

Shushkevich Confirms Belarus' Nuclear-Free Stance

LD1905143692 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1315 GMT 19 May 92

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Minsk, 19 May—Belarus' firm intention to become a neutral, nuclear-free state was reaffirmed today by Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Republic's Supreme Soviet, at a meeting in Minsk with representatives of the Council of Europe Committee on Relations with European Nonmember Countries. Belarus "is the most militarized and nuclear state" per capita, he underlined. This situation has been imposed by the old military doctrine of the former USSR. Now Belarus' parliament and government strictly adhere to a course of neutrality and freedom from nuclear weapons.

"There is but one way to this goal for us: the strictest compliance with all our undertakings, respect for international treaties and agreements, including those signed by the former Soviet Union," Stanislav Shushkevich stressed. He also mentioned that in fact Belarus had removed all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory on 27 April.

Shaposhnikov on Ukraine's Nuclear Obligations

MK2005085992 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 92 p 2

[Report by Natalya Gorodetskaya: "Commander in Chief Shaposhnikov Left Without Official Identity and Does Not Know Who Is Going To Pay His Wages"]

[Text] In Shaposhnikov's opinion, this subject should be discussed in the future by the CIS heads of state who signed the Treaty on Collective Security. Admittedly, this treaty, the CIS Armed Forces commander in chief believes, is not specific enough, but it is good that the heads of state have "stopped being afraid of offending one another and have abandoned vague phrases." Now "it has become clear who wants the CIS to live and flourish so that the army is not dragged off into national compartments" (Karimov, Nazarbayev, and Yeltsin).

That was the assessment of the treaty signed in Tashkent that Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, gave at a meeting yesterday between journalists and 24 officers of the Strategic Nuclear Air Regiment of the long-range air division based in the Ukrainian city of Uzen. The regiment's officers, who have not taken the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, have come to Moscow to find out what is going to become of them. The division has switched to the administrative jurisdiction of Ukraine, but for the time being operational control seems to belong to the CIS command.

Appointments and financing are carried out by Ukraine. If you have taken the republic's oath you are subordinate to Ukraine. But what if you have remained loyal to the old oath? To whom are you subordinate? Marshal Shaposhnikov has advised people not to obey any decrees until orders are received from the CIS command. He promised that airmen would then be found a place to serve in Russia. At present, however, it is unknown where this regiment is to be used. "The question of its jurisdiction has to be resolved first," Shaposhnikov stated.

The commander in chief has decided to write to the heads of the CIS nuclear states in connection with Kravchuk's decree on the administrative subordination of the strategic forces to Ukraine and has suggested to them that "Ukraine be obliged either to fulfill earlier commitments or else to explain to the Commonwealth's peoples and the world community that the decisions are not going to be fulfilled." If these questions are not resolved Shaposhnikov plans to appeal to the peoples of the CIS.

At the moment, however, he explained, "when listening to the Ukrainian leaders any normal person gets the feeling that Ukraine joined the CIS to bury the Soviet Union more quickly and then bale out of the Commonwealth."

Further on Strategic Aviation Issue

*PM2105143192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 May 92 p 3*

[Major S. Prokopenko report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Whose Side Are You on, Fellows, Who Will Lead You Into Battle?"]

[Text] Moscow—It seems that another complication has become bound up with the tight knot of contradictions that have cropped up between Russia and Ukraine in the wake of the Black Sea Fleet. A no less significant one. This is the issue of strategic nuclear forces. Under a presidential decree of 5 April, Ukraine placed under its jurisdiction all armed formations stationed on its territory. A special center for controlling strategic nuclear forces and commanding the long-range aviation group has been established in the republic's Defense Ministry. Why does Ukraine need a long-range aviation strike group? How does this step by the Kiev leadership relate to the agreements on strategic forces that were adopted earlier in Minsk and Alma-Ata? Who are we subordinate to in the final analysis?

These and a number of other questions were raised by the aircraft commanders [komandiry korabley] of a long-range aviation regiment stationed at Uzin at a

meeting held in Moscow with Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces, and representatives of the CIS Air Force and long-range aviation command.

This regiment, which in the recent past was one of the best in long-range aviation, achieved notoriety when most of its airmen refused to take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written about this. However, judging by the airmen's accounts, somebody resolved to drag the pilots under the yellow and blue colors by hook or by crook. What other explanation can there be for the fact that over the last two months the regiment's airmen have flown only two flight operations shifts. Major General Bashkirov, acting commander of the long-range aviation group on Ukrainian territory, grounded detachment commander Major Demushkin because he was allegedly planning to fly abroad, to Russia. Some of the pilots have not flown now for more than three or four months...

Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov noted that the actions of the Ukrainian leadership are inconsistent with the previously adopted agreements regarding strategic forces and are establishing a precedent for pulling them apart into national compartments. In this connection the CIS Joint Armed Forces Command has sent a number of documents to the CIS heads of government on whose territory the strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR are stationed. These documents contain a proposal that they should define their positions on this important issue: Whether to confirm their adherence to the agreements adopted in Minsk and Alma-Ata or whether to review them. However, these problems will also be examined at a meeting of the defense ministers of CIS states scheduled to take place 26 May.

A number of questions were touched on during the meeting connected with legal and social protection for airmen who are doing their military service on Ukrainian territory but who have not taken the oath to Ukraine. The commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces assured the regiment's airmen that none of them would find himself out of the service...

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 May carries on page 2 of its First Edition a Sergey Nagayev report on the same meeting entitled "To Moscow for the Truth." Its final two sentence read: "Commander in Chief Ye. Shaposhnikov noted that nobody would be out of a job and firmly insisted that jurisdiction should be unified and interstate. In order to resolve this problem (or to find any solution at all to the problem) the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces intends to assemble the defense ministers of all the Commonwealth countries in the new Joint Armed Forces residence in Moscow 26 May."]

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

JPRS-TAC-92-019
16 June 1992

Washington's 'Passivity' on Republics' Nuclear Status Puzzles Khasbulatov

*OW1905131792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1252 GMT 19 May 92*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature based on "reports by diplomatic correspondents M. Mayorov, I. Porshnev, and others"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At his Monday's [18 May] meeting with Senator Tom Harkin, Democrat from the state of Iowa, the speaker of Russia's parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov said that Washington's "passivity" toward the striving of some former Soviet republics to become nuclear powers puzzled him. "These issues do not belong to the area of bilateral relations between Russia and those republics; they present common interest", R. Khasbulatov pointed out.

It's common knowledge that the former USSR's nuclear arms are deployed in four republics: Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan. With the backing of the world community Moscow believes that Russia alone should be "nuclear successor" to the former USSR. Byelarus shares this viewpoint on the whole.

Kazakhstan had a "special stand" until recently. However, as President Nursultan Nazarbayev pointed out at a brief news conference given in Moscow on Monday before his departure for the U.S., Kazakhstan recognizes the START treaty in full, and is willing to comply with the articles relating to it. N. Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan is prepared to join the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation in the capacity of a denuclearized state.

He also said that Kazakhstan and Russia belong to the same politico-military union, and therefore "the issue of making Kazakh soil available for the needs of common defence and for the deployment of nuclear missiles will be resolved on mutually beneficial conditions".

With reference to the stand taken by Kiev the president of Kazakhstan said he is puzzled by some of Ukraine's legislative acts which actually provide for maintaining nuclear forces on its soil. According to N.Nazarbayev, this might mean that Ukraine is becoming a nuclear state. "I cannot understand this stance", said N.Nazarbayev.

According to Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the joint CIS armed forces, there are two ways to resolve this problem: either strictly observe all commitments, or recognize as invalid all agreements on strategic weapons signed in the framework of the CIS and announce to the world that there are four new nuclear powers.

At a meeting in Moscow on Monday with officers from the Uzen regiment of strategic aircraft stationed in Ukraine E. Shaposhnikov said he intends to suggest to the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan that problems connected with the nuclear potential of the former USSR should be discussed without delay.

This problem will be reviewed at a conference to be held in Moscow next Tuesday. The commander-in-chief of the joint CIS armed forces intends to invite to the conference defence ministers from the Commonwealth countries.

As a matter of fact, as DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent was told by a prominent official in Russia's Foreign Ministry, the problem might get resolved in Lisbon, where the heads of Russian, Ukrainian, Byelarusian, Kazakh and American diplomacies are to confer on May 22-24. They are expected to consider issues relating to the "nuclear legacy" of the former USSR and the ratification of the START treaty. However, the diplomat said, "the chances for making a real breakthrough in Lisbon are not too great".

Kazakhstan will Adhere to Non-proliferation Pact

*OW2605170992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1547 GMT 26 May 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The visit to the U.S. is strategically important to us, President Nazarbayev told the parliament of Kazakhstan on May 26 highlighting his visit to the U.S. "The U.S. has become Kazakhstan's reliable partner for a long-term perspective," he added. The main result of the visit, said Nazarbayev, is that Kazakhstan's security was ensured and that guarantees were provided for steady economic development and for mutually-advantageous bilateral contacts.

In Washington, Kazakhstan confirmed its readiness to join the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, "retaining the right to exercise control over the elimination of nuclear weapons located in its territory". The U.S. promised to render Kazakhstan technical assistance in eliminating weapons.

President Nazarbayev does not share the concern of a number of MPs about the loss of the nuclear status. As long as Kazakhstan has nuclear missiles it remains a target for the opposite side's missiles, he said. He also added that it was not Kazakhstan that exercised control over the nuclear weapons located in its territory. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons gives Kazakhstan the status of a party that has the right to control the actions of other signatories to the treaty. Besides that, Kazakhstan is a peaceful state and its "international image" must be nuclear-free.

In terms of trade and economy, Kazakhstan was granted the most-favoured nation status; guarantees were provided for the capital investments in the Kazakh economy and environmental protection agreements were signed.

Nazarbayev said that during his visit, American business quarters were offered 125 projects. The most remarkable of them is the joint project with the Chevron oil corporation.

Further on Briefing

*OW2605223692 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2059 GMT 26 May 92*

[Prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "Kazakhstan has acquired the U.S. as a good partner for a long period of time. The visit has a strategic importance for us", President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated at a session of the republican Supreme Soviet Tuesday [26 May] making comments on the results of his visit.

According to the head of state, two global tasks were solved during the visit: the assurance of Kazakhstan's security and the confirmation of the development of the bilateral mutually beneficial relations, and the most favored nations status in trade for Kazakhstan has the specific significance for achieving these goals.

President underlined that in Washington Kazakhstan confirmed its readiness to join the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons [NPT] "retaining the right to control the destruction of nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of the republic". Nursultan Nazarbayev said that the U.S. promised to render technical assistance in destroying the weapons.

The parliamentarians expressed their concern on Kazakhstan's security due to the loss of the nuclear power's status of the republic. Nazarbayev underlined that the real security of Kazakhstan will not suffer due to the joining to the NPT treaty. The President believes that Kazakhstan is a peaceful state and "the international image" of Kazakhstan must be non-nuclear. According to him, the republic must not be a bugaboo threatening all other republics".

Nazarbayev noted that during the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund the principal course of Kazakhstan on the developing of market relations was approved. The IMF's experts helped to develop a plan on activation and introduction of the market relations in the republic. Nazarbayev says that the U.S. will open an access to the modern technologies which will help to overcome the crisis and to redirect the economy from natural resources exploitation to the development of industry.

President stated that the current crisis can be overcome, and the development of economy will bring great results only due to the stable situation in Kazakhstan. He stands for the strengthening of the international relations, saying that the parliament must do its utmost in this direction. The President also noted that several enterprises are aggravating the situation setting forward the demand on the raising of salaries. He declared that these demands are inadmissible without the increase of a real output of the working people.

Position on Arms Treaty, Collective Security

*LD2405182192 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 24 May 92*

[Video report by correspondent Aleksandr Peslyak from Moscow's Vnukovo Airport; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The first official visit to the United States by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev has ended. He arrived back in Moscow today and will meet Russian President Yeltsin tomorrow. Awaiting Nazarbayev's airplane this morning were officials and numerous journalists who were interested in discovering directly from the president Kazakhstan's position on nuclear disarmament, especially as it has been defined literally during the last few days in Washington and Lisbon.

[Peslyak] The long-term documents signed in the economic and scientific and technical sphere on mutual investment, as well as the mutually advantageous agreement with the Chevron Company on the Tengiz oilfield, are the first signs of big business' confidence in Kazakhstan. Here is what Nazarbayev had to say in regard to politics, global problems, and nuclear fears.

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] We have been recognized by the United States as a party to the treaty and will ratify the treaty on strategic offensive weapons independently. Second, on 15 May we set up the collective security council. [end recording]

[Peslyak] This is where six CIS countries proclaimed that aggression against one of the participants would be considered aggression against them all. According to Nazarbayev, the Russian nuclear umbrella will fully guarantee Kazakhstan's security.

For their part, the Americans confirmed that any state that declares itself a nuclear-free state would be under the protection of the world community. Finally, Nazarbayev recalled that second to Japan, Kazakhstan has suffered more than anyone from atomic energy. Nuclear explosions have been carried out secretly there for 40 years. This is the source of the battle against all means of mass destruction in their own and other countries.

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] This is why we will implement all of the points within the treaty on the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons. We are joining the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as a nuclear-free state. [end recording]

Commentary Reviews U.S. Visit

*LD2305230492 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 23 May 92*

[Igor Amvrosov commentary]

[Text] As is known, the official visit to the United States by the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has ended. The reaching of a Kazakhstan-American agreement on the form of Alma-Ata's participation in the

fulfillment of the Soviet-American START treaty and on Kazakhstan joining the nuclear non-proliferation treaty are described by observers as the major results of this visit of international importance. A few details of the accords reached at the talks between Nazarbayev and Bush and between Nazarbayev and U.S. Secretary of State Baker are commented upon by Igor Amvrosov:

[Amvrosov] Diplomacy has always been based on compromises and links. The results of the first visit to the United States by the president of Kazakhstan confirm this truth many times over. Judge for yourselves:

An economic agreement between the United States and Kazakhstan was unthinkable without Kazakhstan's agreement to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state. Nursultan Nazarbayev had enough political sagacity in order to lift demands in good time both for the recognition of Kazakhstan as a nuclear state and for an American nuclear umbrella over Kazakhstan in the event of Kazakhstan acquiring nuclear-free status. In turn, the Americans agreed to Kazakhstan becoming a full party to the Soviet-American START treaty and ratifying it on equal footing with the United States, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. At the same time, the United States agreed that between the ratification by Kazakhstan of the START treaty and acquisition by this country of full nuclear-free status there should be a certain time gap. In the case of Kazakhstan it will, to all appearances, be a gap of seven years. Nursultan Nazarbayev signed in Washington a special guarantee letter stating among other things Kazakhstan's commitment to remove from its territory all 104 intercontinental ballistic missiles with 1,040 nuclear warheads before the year 2000.

Kazakhstan, just as previously Ukraine, agreed to the American idea of registering the participation of all four nuclear CIS countries in the ratification of the Soviet-American treaty. The Americans have prepared a protocol to the START treaty which is to be signed and ratified together with the treaty by the United States, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus.

Here again one must recall the art of compromise. Now a compromise must be reached with Russia and Belarus. This was stated plainly by representatives of the U.S. State Department. Until recently Russia's stand in this matter has been consistently drifting. Initially Russia opposed in principle any form of ratification of the START treaty by anyone from the former Soviet republics. Afterwards, when the Americans put forward the idea of a protocol to the treaty, Russia was ready to agree to a quadrilateral protocol with the United States taking part. Today Ukraine and Kazakhstan are agreeable to the United States taking part in this protocol. We have no information yet regarding the stand of Russia and Belarus. Perhaps if Russia objected to a five-sided protocol, it should, in response to the American draft, quickly prepare its own four-sided one. This was not done. In diplomacy, as in other spheres of life, who is not in time misses the boat. Russia, to all appearances,

hardly wants to stand in the way of the ratification and the start of the fulfillment of a major international document on reducing strategic nuclear armaments. For this reason the prospects for the signing of a five-sided protocol to the treaty seem quite good.

Press Conference on Nuclear Position

*LD2105113592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1020 GMT 21 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Pavel Vanichkin and Ivan Lebedev]

[Text] Washington May 21 TASS—"I am satisfied with the talk I had with President Bush and with the documents that we signed on Tuesday at the White House," Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev told a press conference on Wednesday at the National Press Club, summing up the results of the Washington part of his official visit to the United States.

The president stressed that there were no differences left between Kazakhstan and the United States on controls over nuclear weapons. Asked what will be done with the strategic nuclear armaments, deployed on the territory of Kazakhstan and not covered by the CIS treaty, Nazarbayev said: "It is first necessary to fulfill the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. Let's live seven more years and implement it".

In light of this, Nazarbayev noted the importance of the Collective Security Treaty, initialled by CIS heads of state during their latest meeting in Tashkent. According to the president, "the question of whether nuclear weapons will be deployed or not on the territories of parties to this treaty will depend on the future political situation".

During his brief talk with reporters before departure, Nazarbayev said: "All the tasks of our delegation have been fulfilled. The main task was to present Kazakhstan to the eyes of the United States, to outline the main principles of its domestic and foreign policies. My meeting with President Bush, as well as several meetings with Secretary of State Baker, show that relationships between the United States and Kazakhstan are rising to an absolutely new height. I am very much satisfied with the results of these meetings."

Asked by ITAR-TASS whether Kazakhstan was prepared to sign the protocol to the strategic armaments treaty during the Lisbon International Conference on aid to new independent states, Nazarbayev said: "Yes, we are prepared to do it, but with due account of the agreement we had reached with President Yeltsin before my departure here, with due account of the fact that Russia and Kazakhstan are now parties to the Collective Security Council."

The Kazakh president said he regarded the bilateral commercial and economic agreement, signed by him and President Bush, as one of the most important results of his visit to Washington. He said that during meetings with leaders of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund he "raised the question of accelerating the programme of aid to Kazakhstan and, in particular, to Russia". "I believe that success of the reforms, now

under way in Russia, is important not only for the latter, but for all of us," Nazarbayev added.

Then the Kazakh president left for the Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, whence he flew on the same day to New York.

'Strategic Development' Plan Outlined

*OW2005193592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1750 GMT 20 May 92*

[From the "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "PB" [Presidential Bulletin] presents the program of strategic development of Kazakhstan, developed under the direction of President Nazarbayev.

In spite of Kazakhstan's wish to preserve the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, the President said, the actions of certain members of the Commonwealth have motivated the republic to create its own army. "This step has already been taken", he said.

Nazarbayev feels the national security system must be formed on the following principles:

- guaranteeing the security of the republic, its national and territorial wholeness, primarily through political measures and strengthened economic cooperation;
- control of security departments by the highest power structures and society via openness;
- adequately organized armed forces and sufficient level of technology and arms based on the principle of defense;
- correspondence of the construction of the national security system to government principles and norms of international law considering national-historical traditions and world experience.

As the President says the main point in the national security system is the military doctrine with its mechanism for the prevention and resistance of military threat.

At the same time he stresses that the leadership of the republic states that it has no territorial claims to other nations.

The President says Kazakhstan has as its main goal the participation in the formation of a system of collective world security and assumes responsibility to cooperate in any peacemaking efforts. Recognizing the commonality of military-political and economic interests between Kazakhstan and Russia and other Commonwealth states, Nazarbayev supports coordinating efforts to strengthen international security with all United Nations members.

Kazakhstan considers the support of its defense capabilities one of its most important functions and until a comprehensive system of national security is formed will

conduct military construction with other nations wishing to join the security union. Our main purpose is the defense of sovereignty and the territorial wholeness of Kazakhstan.

The President feels that the formation of armed forces must be completed in a short time period on the basis of the conception of defense strategy. The armed forces should include land troops, an airforce, anti-aircraft defenses, naval units, and supply and service divisions and units. During military times its reserve will be the internal forces and republican guard. The army's main purpose is the prevention of aggression against Kazakhstan and its allies, and the defense of sovereignty and territorial wholeness of nations participating in the defense union.

On Ukraine Retaining Nuclear Forces

*OW1805120692 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1051 GMT 18 May 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has declared puzzlement at the Ukraine's adoption of a number of legislative acts, virtually providing for the retention of nuclear forces on its territory. At a briefing in Moscow on Monday before flying off to the US, he voiced the view that such Kiev's actions meant that Ukraine was become a nuclear state. "That position is not understandable for me", Mr. Nazarbayev said.

In his words, only Russia should remain a nuclear state, in which case, nuclear weapons wouldn't spread, nor the Nuclear Weapons' Nonproliferation Treaty be breached.

About relations with Russia, Mr. Nazarbayev noted that Kazakhstan and Russia were military and political allies, and for this reason, we shall settle "the issue on making Kazakh soil available for common defence and for nuclear missiles' deployment on mutually advantageous terms". He also pointed out that he fully accepted the CIS Treaty, would implement that part of it which concerned Kazakhstan and, as a nonnuclear state, would join the Nuclear Weapons' Nonproliferation Treaty

That position—Mr. Nazarbayev said—was outlined in the letter we sent with Boris Yeltsin to the US President George Bush on May 17th.

Russian Defense Minister Grachev on Kazakh Weapons Removal

*LD2605033492 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0300 GMT 26 May 92*

[Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has stated that the presence of nontactical weapons in Kazakhstan is out of the question; they will all be removed to Russia.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES**JPRS-TAC-92-019
16 June 1992**

Speaking to journalists on the results of yesterday's talks between the Russian and Kazakh presidents, he commented that Russia will establish its own nuclear forces in the future once the START treaty has been carried out. At this moment, Gorbachev said, all strategic forces are under CIS joint command.

Ukraine, Russia Still Differ on Nuclear Control

*PM2805115792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 May 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Russia and Ukraine Continue Dispute Because of the Nuclear Button"]

[Excerpts] As already reported in IZVESTIYA (No. 122), the regular session of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers was held 26 May. Only the leaders of the military departments of Azerbaijan and Moldova did not attend. [passage omitted]

It emerged at the press briefing which CIS generals held after the conference that the disagreement between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations over strategic nuclear forces stationed on Ukrainian territory had remained unresolvable. As Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan, Ukrainian deputy defense minister, stated, Ukraine, true to its international commitments, lays no claim to the nuclear button, and strategic missiles will

remain under Russia's operational command, but it does reserve the right of administrative direction of those troops.

His words provoked a sharp, albeit measured, comment from Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov, representative of the Russian General Staff:

"The responsibility for such awesome weapons as strategic nuclear missiles should be in one pair of hands."

What lies behind the terms "administrative and operational direction?" Ukraine thinks the decision to use strategic weapons (operational command and control) can remain with Moscow, but units of the strategic forces, while in Ukraine, should form part of its Armed Forces, and officers and men should take the Ukrainian oath of allegiance. The new intakes for such units should be made up solely of citizens of the Ukrainian state and not draftees from Russia or other CIS countries.

But that raises the question, according to Russian experts, of whose orders such strategic units would ultimately execute.

Dual command in such a serious matter, no matter what the justification, is bound to raise serious concern both here and in the international community.

FRANCE

French Evaluation of U.S. GPALS Initiative

92ES0799A Paris LIBERATION
in French 28 Apr 92 p 6

[Commentary by Francois Gere, director of the Observatory of the Strategy of the United States, a French national defense research foundation: "American Space, French Strategy"]

[Text] *The U.S. Government's launching of a watered-down form of space war fails entirely to tally with France's fundamental interests; but, paradoxically, it is prompting us to look, for the first time, into the question of a defense against tactical missiles, which also is an absolute necessity.*

Is the glitter of Star Wars waning? SDIO [Strategic Defense Initiative Organization] Director Henry Cooper's European tour appears not to have received the enthusiastic support of the allies for a complex strategic plan. Since the summer of 1991, this plan has had the name GPALS for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. It is the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] pared down to post-cold war dimensions and boosted by the more spectacular than real effects of the Scud-Patriot duel. Strengthened by a substantial increase in appropriations under the Missile Defense Act of November 1991, GPALS combines three basic elements:

—The ATBM [Antitactical Ballistic Missile] for theater or tactical defense, which includes several research programs: An improved Patriot, Corsam, Arrow, and Thaads.

—Activation of the Grand Forks site in North Dakota, with a long-range radar and 100 ground-based interceptors, in accordance with the 1972 ABM treaty.

—The SDI programs, strictly speaking, including Brilliant Eyes sensors and Brilliant Pebbles, which are kinetic interceptors based in space. Even though the objective is no greater than to be able to destroy some 200 nuclear warheads, this system must include several hundred units deployed in low earth orbit, and be able to distinguish between decoys and the real nuclear charges. This is an infinitely complex operation, whose result is highly doubtful. Actually, the capacity of the "pebbles" makes them a far more effective and fearsome antisatellite weapon. Therefore, the Congress has forbidden their deployment, and "abides" by the ABM treaty, no longer because of the Soviets, but as a frame of reference for differentiating between the essential and the superfluous, which is unnecessarily costly and politically dangerous.

To surmount this opposition, the SDIO turns to the enemies of yesteryear and to the Allies. Anxious to save what can still be saved, Boris Eltsine, by stating that he favors a revision of the ABM treaty, without ever mentioning specifics, maintains a fluid situation that the SDIO exploits to advantage. As for the Allies who, like

France, have not concealed their interest in space sensors, they lost no time in presenting as support for the GPALS as a whole what was really nothing more than curiosity with respect to specific elements. This produced considerable turbulence, to which Admiral Lanxade's recent statements have put an end: No to the militarization of space, no to an alliance of the affluent against an undefinable "south," and no to a plan aimed at incapacitating the small nuclear powers and above all at establishing an American space hegemony. This leaves the ATBM's.

In the past, the coherence of the deterrent plan with respect to the Warsaw Pact precluded a recourse to ATBM's, which, by implying preparation for nuclear battle, would have undermined the credibility of escalation. But this left the Allies facing a considerable military power, and the risk so incurred was immense. Today, the threat has disappeared and the ATBM's, which have achieved real technical advances (current know-how has infinitely surpassed the Patriot), are seeking a strategic reason for being. If one takes the range of an Iraqi Al-Husayn missile, approximately 1,000 kilometers, and draws radii to see from where one could come and where it could land, the United States obviously need not be overly concerned. But for France and Italy, there is a Mediterranean region that lends itself to the conjuring up of catastrophic scenarios based on the irrationality of dictators insensitive to deterrent logic. The term "tactical" adds to the confusion. A so-called "tactical" short-range missile striking a French city takes on a "strategic" value, in that an aggression has been committed against our national territory. A missile is therefore not any more tactical than strategic. It is the manner of its use and the purpose it serves—that is, the nature of the political effect it is sought to achieve through recourse to a given dosage of the effects of physical violence—that legitimately determine its place in this type of classification.

Hence, the relevant questions:

—What politico-strategic purpose would be served by the firing of one or several missiles on France by a "southern" country?

—What level of virtual response would be commensurate with the threat of an aggression of this type while retaining a deterrent value with respect to the strategic plan the aggression is intended to further? Certainly not the nuclear level initially. On the other hand, the threat of a chemical aggression would justify the counterthreat of a nuclear reprisal. But the advent of such an aggression could be expected to have been preceded by a formidable degradation of relations between the countries concerned. The outlook has a broad back.

The current debate nevertheless centers on strategy. To begin with, there is a worldwide strategic change. The disappearance of the USSR reduces the relative importance of deterrence (and interdiction) in the military strategy of the nuclear countries. Whereas the dominant

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political end-purposes were negative, in that the primary consideration was defense against the adversary, they have spontaneously recovered their positive direction, in the sense that the plans of one and the other can be based on the assumption that the resistance to be encountered will be of low intensity at most. A certain freedom of action has again become possible at the risks and perils of each player; hence the Gulf War. However, because of the military nuclear aspect, freedom of action must be defined in new terms.

Then, there is France's strategy, on which two questions arise: The first touches on the end-purpose to be served by the volume and quality of its nuclear forces. Having never served as other than a weaker power's deterrent vis-a-vis a stronger power, they need not be reduced in as considerable proportions as the arsenals of the superpowers. Suffice it to maintain their qualitative level and, quantitatively, to guard against any deviation in the direction of counterforce concepts.

The second has to do with the nature of the political outlook in the post-cold-war environment. We can no longer pretend to ignore the fact that France's conventional forces have never been suited either to the support of the "FYI" [for your information] message that was supposed to accompany, in West Europe, the launching of the nuclear deterrent, and that no longer necessarily has a reason for being today, or to a strategy of action concomitant with nuclear deterrence. How can today's requirements be met without perpetuating yesterday's shortcomings? It is a matter of assessing the ratio between conventional forces and nuclear forces on the

basis of negative objectives versus positive objectives as defined in terms of political outlook. In other words, we must ensure our own existence, and this requires maintaining sufficient and very flexible nuclear capabilities for dealing with the possibility of a large-scale hostile plan of which we know nothing today. This brings us back to the old deterrent. But we must also promote prosperity (action), hence have available a sufficient volume of forces of intervention or reprisal to prevail in the face of hostile intents. It is in this case, and only in this case, and subject to a serious evaluation of cost versus effectiveness, that, for France, the question of gearing up for an ATBM capability would arise.

The GPALS initiative thus has its involuntary merits. In the wake of the cold war, it stresses the political in the defining of its plan, and stimulates the imagination of the strategist, who must invent the ways and means of advancing it. Creation is definitely the child of necessity.

GREECE

Nuclear Weapons To Be Removed from Greek Territory

NC2205154192 Athens Elliniki Radhiosfonia Radio Network in Greek 1130 GMT 22 May 92

[Text] A Foreign Ministry statement issued today says that Greece's nuclear stockpile will be removed from Greek territory. The statement adds: Within the framework of President Bush's initiative for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and following negotiations between the Greek and U.S. Governments, the Greek nuclear stockpile will be removed.

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